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This dissertation is about biological sex and how we ought to make sense of it.  
By biological sex I mean those elements of an individual‘s body that are 
involved in reproduction of the individual‘s species; by make sense of it I 
mean the way in which the occurrence of these elements and their interactions 
are conceptualized in our minds.  Given certain things that are known about 
sex and reproduction, I argue in this dissertation that sex, maleness, and 
femaleness ought to be conceptualized in a specific way: this specific way is 
what I call the multidimensional model of sex. 
My argument challenges what I call the folk understanding of biological sex, 
which is (generally speaking) the understanding that most people in most 
places have about what makes a person male or female.  This understanding, I 
argue, takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to be logically opposed and 
atomistic, and constitutive of categories with homogeneous members. I 
explore three important facts that challenge this understanding:  1) the 
emphasis on continuity within biological thought, 2) the understanding of sex 
differences within biology, and 3) the occurrence of intersexuality in human 
beings. 
Some authors have already proposed continuum-based understandings of 
SEX as a replacement for the folk understanding.  I identify and discuss three 
of these: 1) the basic continuum model  (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 2000; 
Blackless, et al. 2000; Kessler 1998; Preves 2003; Intersex Society of North 
America 2011a; Organisation International des Intersexués 2011a), 2) the 
multiple continua model (Stoltenberg 1989), and 3) the hybrid model (Stein 
2001; Dreger 1998).  Inherent to different degrees within each of these models 
is the belief that maleness and femaleness are somehow conceptually opposite 




is not borne out in nature, as demonstrated in part by the occurrence of 
intersexuality in the species Homo sapiens, and the occurrence of 
hermaphroditism in other species. These occurrences, I argue, suggest another 
way to make sense of sex. 
The model of sex that I present is inspired by the occurrence of 
intersexuality and hermaphroditism, and also by Sandra Bem‘s (1974) work 
on the concept ANDROGYNY.  Bem reconceptualized masculinity and 
femininity as dimensions of psychological androgyny.  I argue that the 
concepts MALE and FEMALE, and thus BIOLOGICAL SEX, can be understood in a 
similar way. I propose a multidimensional model of SEX that includes the 
concepts MALE and FEMALE as intersecting continua that create a space in 
which the separate features of an individual‘s sex are each individually 
located.  
The dissertation concludes by discussing the moral implications of the 
multidimensional model, as some of our judgments about the rightness or 
wrongness of a person‘s actions are related to our understanding of that 
person‘s sex.  But if the words male and female come to refer to individual 
parts of the body and not whole people (as I argue they would, if the 
multidimensional model were adopted), how would our ideas about the moral 
acceptability of certain actions and practices change?  By examining this 
general question, I show that adoption of the multidimensional model of sex is 
important not just because it offers a more biologically accurate representation 
of sex:  it is also important, I conclude, because there is good reason to think 
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1.1 Questioning the concept BIOLOGICAL SEX 
People generally do not like to hear that they are wrong, especially when they 
have a great interest in being right.  They are also less likely to consider the 
possibility that they are wrong the more people there are who agree with them.  
Given these general truths about human behaviour, this dissertation is perhaps 
taking on a quixotic task.   
In this dissertation, I will argue that most people are mistaken about 
something they really want to be right about, and something most people think 
they are right about:  biological sex.  I believe, and will argue, that most 
people are mistaken about what the terms male and female refer to, and what 
kind of difference exists between people we call male and people we call 
female. 
This introduction will provide a brief sketch of the main ideas I will criticize 




first describe the three ideas that are at the core of most people‘s 
understanding of biological sex.  These ideas are very likely to be met with a 
high level of resistance; to address this, I will provide a few considerations to 
spur the reader on.  I will then briefly describe the particular 
reconceptualization I will be presenting in this dissertation.  
 
 
1.2 Three beliefs of the folk understanding 
I will argue that the dominant understanding of biological sex, what will be 
called the folk understanding of biological sex, involves three basic beliefs 
about the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female.‘ These three basic beliefs are:  (1) 
that all males are alike with respect to their maleness, and that all females are 
alike with respect to their femaleness; (2)  that whatever makes a male a male 
and whatever makes a female a female are each only ever possessed in whole 
and never just in part; and (3) that the concepts MALE and FEMALE are logically 
opposed to each other.   
The first belief, which I will later refer to as the belief in group member 
homogeneity,  has to do with the relationships that the folk understanding 
takes to exist between group members of the category ‗male,‘ and between 
group members of the category ‗female.‘  The term group member just 
means those things that belong to a particular group.  My car, for example, 
is a group member of the category ‗car;‘  a leaf on the ground is a group 
member of the category ‗leaf.‘  When people identify someone as a male, 
they are identifying that individual as a member of the category ‗male.‘  
Anyone identified as a female is identified as a member of the category 
‗female.‘  As I will argue in a later chapter, the folk understanding of 




identical with respect to the quality that makes them male, and group 
members of the category ‗female‘ to be identical with respect to the 
quality that makes them female.  These qualities can be referred to as 
maleness and femaleness, respectively. 
The second belief that I will challenge has to do with the nature of the 
qualities maleness and femaleness.  The folk understanding, I will argue, 
takes these features to be single, simple things that cannot be 
disassembled.  Because there are no ―parts‖ to these qualities, there is no 
variation between group members with relation to these parts either: there 
is no having more or less of whatever makes particular people whichever 
sex they are.  I call these associated commitments the belief in atomistic 
structure. 
The third main belief of the folk understanding, the belief in logical 
opposition, has to do with the particular relationship the folk 
understanding takes there to exist between the concepts MALE and FEMALE, 
between the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ and the people regulated by 
them.  With the folk understanding, the information {not female} is 
contained within the meaning of the word male, and the information {not 
male} is contained within the meaning of the word female.  The same sort 
of relationship exists between the concepts INTERSECTING LINES and 
PARALLEL LINES.  People who are familiar with these concepts know that 
lines that fit in the category ‗intersecting lines‘ are not parallel, and that 
those that fit in the category ‗parallel lines‘ are not intersecting.  The folk 
understanding, I will argue, takes the same sort of relationship to exist 
between the concepts MALE and FEMALE.  Because of the belief in logical 
opposition, proponents of the folk understanding believe that people who 
fit into the category ‗male‘ are not female, and people who fit into the 




In this dissertation, I will argue that these three beliefs about biological 
sex are wrong.  Stated negatively, I will be arguing:  (1) that all people  
categorized as ‗male‘ are not identical with respect to their sex; (2) that all 
people categorized as ‗female‘ are not identical with respect to their sex ; 
(3) that MALENESS and FEMALENESS, represented as intersecting continua, 
create the foundation for the concept SEX; and (4) that the concepts MALE 
and FEMALE are mistaken if they contain the information {not female} and 
{not male}, respectively.  Stated positively, I will be arguing: (1) that 
people within the category ‗male‘ differ from one another in relation to 
sexual features; (2) that people within the category ‗female‘ differ from 
one another in relation to sexual features; (3) that what makes people the 
sex that they are is complex; and (4) that the concepts MALE and FEMALE 
should be represented as co-constitutive, bisecting continua that form the 
basic foundation of the concept SEX. 
 
 
1.3 Why someone who holds the folk understanding 
should read on 
Most people are strongly motivated to resist any suggestion that the folk 
understanding is flawed. This motivation is understandable, given that if 
the three beliefs just outlined are doubted (or abandoned), then one must be 
willing to doubt (or abandon) one‘s own identity as well.  Most people believe 
that to be a human individual is to be, by logical necessity, a female human 
individual or a male human individual; furthermore, most people consistently 
experience themselves as being either a male or a female throughout their 
entire lives.  For most people, reconceptualizing sex will require no less than 




People can dismiss alternative views in a number of ways.  One could 
dismiss a different view of biological sex by claiming that it is motivated 
by the desire to be controversial or provocative, rather than the desire to be  
accurate.  One could dismiss it by claiming that it is obviously not well-
reasoned.  One could also dismiss it by saying that it is simply irrelevant 
to how life is actually lived day-to-day.  I am drawing attention to these 
reactions because within the context of this dissertation they could 
translate into someone not reading beyond this page.  I hope that readers 
will resist the temptation to dismiss, and can offer two reasons for them to 
do so. 
The first reason is, admittedly, rather cheap: sex, whatever meaning it 
has, is endlessly interesting.  Biological sex, having sex, and sexuality are 
all bound up together, and despite our wishing otherwise at times, people 
are interested in it.  Has any culture ever tired of discussing, representing, 
managing, or condemning sex?  The curiosity most people have about sex 
will, I hope, spur people on despite their initial urge to dismiss and reject 
the ideas I will present herein.  Another reason to resist the temptation to 
dismiss is that what I am saying might not be quite as outlandish as it first 
sounds.  In this dissertation I am not claiming that the concepts SEX, MALE, 
and FEMALE are meaningless;  I am, rather, saying that they have meanings 
other than those that the folk understanding suggests.  I am also not claiming 
that the concepts MALE and FEMALE cannot help us understand people‘s 
bodies; I do argue, however, that they relate to bodies in a different way than 
the one suggested by the folk understanding. 
So what are the claims that I am making? The next section will provide 





1.4 Sex as a concept 
What does it mean to speak of the concept SEX? To answer this question I 
should clarify what I mean by the word sex and what I mean by the word 
concept.  First, by the word sex I mean the sex that people are, not the sex that 
people have. My argument focuses upon the concepts SEX, MALE and FEMALE, 
and the categories related to them, not on the concepts SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, 
SEXUAL ACTIVITY or SEXUALITY and the categories related to them (i.e., 
‗heterosexual,‘ ‗homosexual,‘ ‗bisexual,‘ etc.).   
So what do I mean when I say I will be speaking about biological sex as a 
concept?  Gregory L. Murphy (2002) explains in his Big Book of Concepts that 
we use concepts to interpret and manage our experiences of the world in a 
particular way (1).  He writes: 
If we have formed a concept (a mental representation) 
corresponding to that category (the class of objects in the 
world), the concept will help us understand and respond 
appropriately to a new entity in that category. (1) 
So, when I am speaking about SEX as a concept I am speaking about the 
representation that exists in people‘s minds of the sex that exists in people‘s 




1.5 How sex can be multidimensional 
My argument is fundamentally about how the concept BIOLOGICAL SEX 
ought to be represented in peoples‘ minds, and how adopting the 
reconceptualization I suggest would likely improve interactions between 




represented as an image created by mapping an individual‘s sexual 
features onto the space created by the two intersecting continua MaleC and 
FemaleC.   
If the suggestion that information should be represented by using shapes 
and their dimensions seems unfamiliar, it might be worth pausing for a 
moment to consider that people actually do this quite often.  Compare 
three familiar shapes: a line, a square, and a cube. 
 
A line has only one dimension (LengthD), a square has two (HeightD and 
WidthD), and a cube has three (HeightD, WidthD, and DepthD) (see Figure 
1-1).  Each of these shapes can be used to represent information.  A single 
line is good for representing a single thing, such as the age of a baby.  A 
square shape, because it has two dimensions, provides a good basis for 
representing the literal coincidence of two different kinds of information, 
such as a baby‘s age and weight (see Figure 1-2, below).  A cube, with its 
three dimensions, provides the structural basis for the coincidence of three 
different kinds of information: perhaps the baby‘s age, weight, and height.  
The more dimensions, the more information that can be represented 
simultaneously.   
 
1-1 Three shapes and their dimensions 
The three shapes included here (line, square, and cube) are capable of 
representing different types of information.  The more dimensions that a 












By suggesting that biological sex ought to be understood as being 
multidimensional, I mean that it ought to be understood as referring to the 
set of coincidences of two different types of information: 1) how male a 
single feature of an individual‘s sex is, and 2) how female a single feature 
of an individual‘s sex is.  The single feature itself will be represented by 




1-2 Representation of coincidence of two types of information 
This shape illustrates the coincidence of two types of information using two 












1.6 Individual sex 
Part of my argument will show that an individual‘s sex is the image created 
by mapping the relative maleness and femaleness of the components of that 
individual‘s sexual system onto the space created by the intersection of MaleC 
and FemaleC.  Most people are familiar with the existence of different sexual 
parts, though they might be unfamiliar with speaking of them as ―components‖ 
of sex.  The people identified as males by the folk understanding usually 
have an XY chromosomal pair, a penis, and testes; people identified as 
females usually have an XX chromosomal pair, a vagina and vulva, and 
ovaries. In addition to these physical parts, people identified as males and 
females usually produce sperm and ova, respectively.  The folk 
understanding overlooks the variation that can occur with these 
components and instead roughly groups them all together as being either 
strictly male or strictly female.  The multidimensional model I am 
suggesting considers each of these components individually. The 
individual‘s sex can then be conceptualized as the particular grouping created 
by locating each of these components on the space created by the dimensions 
MaleC and FemaleC.  
In highly female individuals and highly male individuals, as represented in 
Figures 1-3 and 1-4 (below), the four elements of biological sex (gonads, 
external genitalia, chromosomes, and gametes) form a cluster within different 
areas of the space created by the intersecting continua MaleC and FemaleC.   
In these illustrations (Figures 1-3 & 1-4), the black circles represent the 
particular expression of the individual‘s gonads, external genitalia, and 
chromosomes in terms of both maleness and femaleness.  In the case of the 
first individual (represented in Figure 1-3), each of these four elements are 
highly female and not male. This person‘s sex is made up of an XX 




produces egg cells.  The reverse can be seen in the case of the other individual 
(represented in Figure 1-4), where each of these four elements is highly male 
and not female.  The individual whose sex is represented in Figure 1-4 has an 
XY chromosomal pair, testes, and male external genitalia, and produces sperm 
cells.  Although it will be discussed later in further detail it must be noted here 
that these two representations of biological sex are not the only possibilities.   
Where exactly each feature is represented in the space will depend on the 
element itself, and how male and how female it is (in other words, how closely 
it approximates the prototypical male and the prototypical female versions of 
 
1-3 Representation of prototypical female sex pattern 
The components of the individual‟s sex (gonads, chromosomes, 
gametes and external genitalia) are mapped on to the 
multidimensional space created by the intersecting continua MaleC 
and FemaleC. Because each component is (1) highly female and (2) 
not male, this individual‟s features are each located in the furthest 
















that feature).  In most cases, a person‘s sex will be represented as a group of 
features in one of two quadrants  (either the quadrant representing a 
combination of maximum maleness and minimum femaleness, or the quadrant 
representing the combination of minimum maleness and maximum 
femaleness).  There is, however, no guarantee that this will always be the case.  
Some people, because of the morphology of their sexual anatomy, could 
require representation in two, three, or all four of the different quadrants, 




1-4 Representation of prototypical male sex pattern 
As with Figure 3-1, the components of the individual‟s sex are mapped 
onto the multidimensional space created by the intersecting continua 
MaleC and FemaleC.  Since each component of this individual‟s sex is (1) 
highly male and (2) not female, they are each located in the further point 




1.7 Plan of development 
The reconceptualization of sex that I am presenting in this dissertation, 
and which I have just briefly summarized, is obviously in tension with 
each of the three basic beliefs of the folk understanding of sex.  The 
multidimensional understanding of sex completely subverts the logical 
opposition and atomism claimed by the folk understanding as it takes 
maleness and femaleness to be bisecting continua, and a person‘s sex to be 
the total composite of individual features located within the space created 
by the intersection of those continua. The belief in group member 
homogeneity is challenged as well, as the multidimensional 
reconceptualization I will present takes the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ 
to be about components of sex, not whole people.   
Given (1) that the multidimensional model is so at odds with the folk 
understanding, and (2) the fact that almost anyone reading this is likely to 
be a proponent of the folk understanding, I need to first clarify the precise 
focus of this argument.  To provide this clarity I will first address the 
concept of GENDER, and the different ways that the relationship between it 
and the concept SEX have been understood.  I will begin here because the 
difference between these understandings is so great that, if they were left 
unaddressed, they would become a rich source of confusion and 
misunderstanding.  In Chapter Two I will discuss three perspectives on the 
relationship between SEX and GENDER.  In discussing these different 
conceptualizations I hope to show that although there is little (if any) 
cross-perspective agreement about what GENDER is, there is enough 
agreement about what SEX is to facilitate cross-perspective discussion of 
this topic.  The existence of cross-perspective agreement, I think, means 
that one can evaluate and discuss the merit of the multidimensional model 




After these clarifications have been made, Chapter Three will provide a 
detailed presentation of the folk understanding of biological sex, with 
focus on the three basic beliefs outlined above.  In this chapter I will argue 
that the folk understanding relies on essentialist thinking about sex, 
meaning that people who espouse this understanding interpret all people 
categorized as ‗male‘ as sharing some essence of maleness, and all people 
categorized as ‗female‘ as sharing some essence of femaleness.   
Chapter Four presents three challenges to the beliefs of the folk 
understanding.  Two of these challenges stem from biology and focus 
specifically on the problems with essentialist thinking about sex.  These 
challenges relate to (1) evolutionary theory, and (2) the biological 
understanding of sex and its emphasis on gamete cells (i.e., egg or sperm 
cells).  The third challenge to the folk understanding stems from the 
existence of intersexuality, which is the co-presence of male and female 
sexual parts in a single individual.  Each of these challenges, I will argue, 
suggest that the folk understanding needs to be either revised or replaced.    
Chapter Five presents alternatives to the folk understanding that have 
already been put forward.  The public awareness of intersexuality (which 
some call disorders of sexual development and many still refer to as 
hermaphroditism) has greatly increased in the last decade or so, and with 
it, awareness of the folk understanding‘s shortcomings.
1
  In response to 
these shortcomings a number of authors have suggested that sex is best 
understood (at least in part) as a continuum that includes both maleness 
and femaleness.  Chapter Five provides a synopsis of three different 
versions of this continuum view of sex:  (1) the hybrid view (Dreger 1998; 
Stein 2001), (2) the single continuum view (Fausto-Sterling 1993; Fausto-
                                                     
1
 I choose to use the words intersex or intersexuality to refer to these conditions instead of 




Sterling 2000; Blackless, et al. 2000), and (3) the multiple continua view 
(Stoltenberg 1989).    
Chapter Six presents the reconceptualization of SEX that I am proposing 
as an alternative to both the folk understanding and the continuum models 
that have been suggested as replacements for the folk understanding. The 
basic features of the multidimensional understanding that have been 
outlined in this chapter will be fully expanded in Chapter Six.  
Chapter Seven explores the moral implications that widespread 
acceptance of the multidimensional model would be likely to have.  Both 
medical and nonmedical issues are discussed in this chapter, with the 
general conclusion that whatever reasons one might have to accept the 
multidimensional model, there is good reason to think that acceptance of 















The argument I will present in this dissertation focuses squarely upon the 
physical, sexual categories of reproduction (i.e., ‗sex,‘ ‗male,‘ and ‗female‘) 
and the relationships between them.  I will not have much to say about social 
categories related to sex (such as ‗man‘ and ‗woman‘), nor about social 
behaviours associated with or expressed by individuals of different sexual 
types (such as masculinity and femininity).  To put it succinctly, my argument 
is about the concept SEX as it refers to reproductive types;  it is not about SEX 
as an activity, nor is it about the concept GENDER.    
The previous sentence will make little to no sense to many people, for many 
reasons, and without addressing this at the outset, my argument will meet the 




other between SEX and GENDER,  there are very few (if any) other points of 
agreement between the various theoretical positions one can take on the 
connections between these concepts.  And there are numerous positions one 
can choose from: one essay, for example, identifies almost thirty different 
meanings and seven different uses of the word gender (Hawkesworth 1997, 
650 - 651). 
Rich histories of the concept GENDER are available elsewhere (Overall 2003, 
and Nicholson 1998).  In this chapter I will only sketch three positions one can 
take on the relationship between SEX and GENDER: (1) the earlier 
conceptualization (found in feminist philosophy), (2) the later 
conceptualization (also found in feminist philosophy), and (3) the folk 
conceptualization.  Following these presentations, I will argue that the 
multidimensional model of SEX can and does make sense no matter the general 
position one takes on SEX and GENDER; to show this, I will provide an 
argument about conceptual features, disagreement, and communication.  This 
argument will show that people can still have meaningful communication 
about sex without explicitly speaking about gender, and that they can do so 
even if the participants of that conversation disagree about the connections 
between the two. 
 
 
2.2 Three ways to think about sex 
2.2.1 Earlier conceptualization: there is sex, and then there is 
gender 
The earlier conceptualization of SEX and GENDER rests on the firm 
commitment that the two are different things, have different sources, are 




relationships to human beings.  The introduction of these distinctions can, in 
large part, be attributed to Simone De Beauvoir‘s (1953) seminal work The 
Second Sex.  De Beauvoir‘s The Second Sex provides an analysis of the 
cultural creation of the concepts WOMANHOOD  and FEMININITY and rejects the 
belief that so-called ―feminine‖ or ―womanly‖ behaviour stems from female 
biology.  Describing the opposite view, The Second Sex explains: ―Woman? 
Very simple, say the fanciers of simple formulas: she is a womb, an ovary; she 
is female – this word is sufficient to define her‖ (3).  De Beauvoir‘s position is 
that the answer to what makes a person feminine (i.e., a woman) is itself 
complex, and cannot be answered simply by referring to that person‘s biology.  
Rather than biology, De Beauvoir‘s work strongly emphasizes the influence of 
social forces.  In what is perhaps one of the most well-known statements in 
feminist philosophy, de Beauvoir asserts:  ―One is not born, but rather, 
becomes a woman‖ (3).   
Commenting upon the influence of de Beauvoir‘s ideas, Marilyn Friedman 
(1996) states ―[e]arly in the contemporary feminist renaissance, gender was 
differentiated from sex and much fruitful work ensued‖ (78).  De Beauvoir‘s 
ideas were so appealing because they suggest greater possibility and flexibility 
for human existence than a view that takes people‘s identity and behaviour to 
be determined by their bodies.  Friedman describes the basic features of sex 
and gender that are characteristic of this conceptualization: 
―[s]ex‖ is the biologically given basis of sex identity and 
sexuality.  Biological sex comprises external and internal 
genital anatomy, anatomically secondary sex-
characteristics, and certain hormonal and chromosomal 
combinations.  The words ―female‖ and ―male‖ identify 
persons in terms of their biologically sexed natures.  
Gender, by contrast, encompasses traits and behaviours 
which mark, and are traditionally thought to express, those 




psychological qualities, intellectual traits, social roles, 
grooming styles, and other modes of self-presentation.  The 
words ―feminine‖ and ―masculine‖ identify persons in terms 
of their gender. (78) 
Linda Nicholson (1998) also describes sex and gender in terms of their 
different levels of malleability (289).  Generally speaking, it was thought that 
people could alter gender-related aspects of themselves; they could not, 
however, change aspects of their sex (289).    
The division between SEX and GENDER (which could really be described as 
the recognition of GENDER itself) highlighted the ways that people with female 
anatomy are made or encouraged to be feminine, and the ways that people 
with male anatomy are made or encouraged to be masculine.  To emphasize 
this point, both Frye (1983b) and Greer (1971) questioned the assumed 
naturalness of attaining any gender role at all, including those considered sex-
appropriate, by comparing the process with gender acquisitions considered to 
be sex-inappropriate.  Greer wrote that ―[t]he ‗normal‘ sex roles that we learn 
to play from our infancy are no more natural than the antics of a transvestite‖ 
(29).  On the same theme, Frye stated that ―nobody goes about in full public 
view as thoroughly decked out in butch and femme drag as respectable 
heterosexuals when they are dressed up to go out in the evening, or to go to 
church, or to go to the office‖ (29).  Frye (1983b) explains that through gender 
(and not through or because of the anatomy of our bodies) we create ―different 
styles of gait, gesture, posture, speech, humor, taste and even of perception, 
interest and attention that we learn as we grow up to be women or to be men‖ 
(23-24). 
By emphasizing the constructed nature of gender, De Beauvoir‘s ideas 
suggested that male-identified behavior and female-identified behavior (i.e., 




people who wanted to do away with them.  Nicholson explains that although 
the body‘s sex is taken to be fixed with this understanding (an idea that itself 
later came into question, as will be discussed in a later chapter) the physical 
body is not all there is to the story of what makes people who and what they 
are.  De Beauvoir, and authors who followed, were able to show that there are 
interrelated but ultimately separate forces at work, and that one of them (i.e., 
gender) could be changed. The proliferation of writing that Friedman speaks 
of was generally optimistic and built upon de Beauvoir‘s suggestion that 
people, no matter their anatomy, had more control over their lives than they 
had previously thought.  Moving from this idea some authors began to explore 
the topic of androgyny (a topic that will be discussed again in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation).  Of this exploration and the interest motivating it, Mary Anne 
Warren (1982) stated that  
[t]o many feminists androgyny has come to represent 
escape from the prison of gender – that is, from socially 
enforced preconceptions of ways in which women and men 
ought to differ in their psychology and behaviour. (170)   
De Beauvoir‘s suggestion that people could change their sex-related behaviour 
seemed widely accepted, and so some moved on to question  how exactly one 
ought to change that behaviour.  Joyce Trebilcot (1982), for example, analyzed 
two forms of androgynism to determine which particular combination of 
masculinity and femininity would be most desirable for society: a form called 
―monoandrogyny‖ (which favours a single standard mix of masculinity and 
femininity to be adopted by all) or a form called ―polyandrogyny‖ (which 
allows for whatever mix of masculinity and femininity individuals chose for 
themselves).    Trebilcot concluded that the latter type, polyandrogyny, was 
the most desirable option of the two, partially because it allows for greater 




The basic beliefs of the earlier conceptualization of the concepts SEX and 
GENDER, which I have outlined in this section, can be summarized as follows: 
Earlier Conceptualization 
The concept SEX includes information about a person‘s 
anatomy (which is either male or female, and unchanging), 
while the concept GENDER includes information about one‘s 
social identity (as a woman or a man) and behaviour (which 
is masculine or feminine, and is flexible). 
  
2.2.2 Later conceptualization:  gender facilitates knowledge of 
sex 
Although the distinction between SEX and GENDER was accepted (and 
perhaps even celebrated) some questioned the way that the division had been 
conceptualized.  Marilyn Frye (1983b) for example, argued against particular 
versions of the earlier conceptualization that took gender to be not much more 
than ―layers of cultural gloss over a biological substratum‖ (35).  Instead, Frye 
argued that the connections between sex and gender, between bodies and 
society, should be understood differently.  She wrote, 
Socialization molds our bodies; enculturation forms our 
skeletons, our musculature, our central nervous systems.  
By the time we are gendered adults, masculinity and 
femininity are ―biological.‖  They are structural and 
material features of how our bodies are. (37, emphasis in 
original) 
Alison Jaggar (1983) argued along the same line in her work Feminist Politics 
and Human Nature.  She wrote:  
Feminists have recognized for a long time that many of the 
psychological differences between the sexes are socially 
produced, but few have realized that this is also true of 




are in part socially produced both on the level of the 
individual and the level of the species. (109) 
As examples of biological change brought about by social influence, Jaggar 
discusses such things as the way the clothing an individual wears can shape 
the body over time, and the way that a species‘ anatomy can change over time 
because of social developments in its evolutionary history (109-110).   
The later conceptualization that I will focus on builds upon insights such as 
Frye‘s and Jaggar‘s that biological sex or the body can change, and that gender 
or society can actively influence how the body is changed.  According to the 
particular version of the later conceptualization that I will be describing here, 
gender is a creative force and the human conceptualization of SEX (among 
other things) is one of its products.   
One of the most well-known proponents of what I call the later 
conceptualization of SEX and GENDER is Judith Butler.  In her work Gender 
Trouble ([1990] 2006) Butler states,  
[i]f the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this 
construct called ―sex‖ is as culturally constructed as gender; 
indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender 
turns out to be no distinction at all. (9 - 10) 
The order Butler suggests here reverses the ontological arrangement proposed 
by the earlier conceptualization. Those who understand SEX and GENDER from 
the earlier conceptualization understand the former to be ontologically 
primary;  without biological sex, there never would have been or could have 
been gender.  Butler is suggesting that the reverse of this is actually the case.  
She explains: 
Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural 
inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical 




of production whereby the sexes themselves are also 
established.  As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to 
nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by 
which ―sexed nature‖ or ―a natural sex‖ is produced and 
established as ―prediscursive,‖ prior to culture, a politically 
neutral surface on which culture acts. (10) 
The concept GENDER, in Butler‘s view, involves something much more potent 
than it does in the earlier conceptualization.  For Butler, GENDER involves a 
sort of cognitive framework that actively facilitates and mediates a person‘s 
experience and understanding of biological sex.   
Another example of the later view is expressed by Thomas Laqueur in his 
work Making Sex (1990).  In this work Laqueur criticizes the idea that 
biological sex can be known in the absence of gender, and speaks of the latter 
as a creative, human force.  ―Sex‖ he says, ―…is situational;  it is explicable 
only within the context of battles over gender and power‖ (11).  Laqueur‘s 
comments suggest that he would think that the attempt to speak about sex in 
the absence of gender (which is, of course, what this dissertation aims to do) is 
naïve.  Of such an endeavour, Laqueur says, 
[s]ex, like being human, is contextual.  Attempts to isolate it 
from its discursive, socially determined milieu are as 
doomed to failure as the philosophe’s search for a truly wild 
child or the anthropologist‘s efforts to filter out the cultural 
so as to leave a residue of essential humanity.  And I would 
go further and add that the private, enclosed, stable body 
that seems to lie at the basis of modern notions of sexual 
difference is also the product of particular, historical, 
cultural moments.  It too, like opposite sexes, comes in and 
out of focus. (16) 
Later in this chapter I will present an argument to address this sort of concern 
about the legitimacy of the reconceptualization I present in this dissertation.  




and Butler actually have very little to say about biological sex except to point 
out that sex itself (i.e., sex without gender, or sex in the absence of gender) 
cannot be known.  Butler explains, saying ―[t]he juridical structures of 
language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, there 
is no position outside the field, but only a critical genealogy of its own 
legitimating practices‖ (7).   
In conclusion, the basic beliefs of the later conceptualization of the concepts 
SEX and GENDER can be summarized as follows: 
Later Conceptualization 
The concept GENDER involves a culturally creative force 
that facilitates any conceptualization of SEX. 
 
2.2.3  The folk conceptualization: gender, also known as sex  
Chapter Three of this dissertation will give a detailed description of the folk 
understanding of biological sex.  In this section I will only briefly describe the 
folk understanding‘s interpretation of the relationship between SEX and 
GENDER. This description can be brief because the relationship is 
uncomplicated:  what gender refers to, from the folk perspective, is sex. 
Christine Overall (2003) points out that ―the unspecified use of the term 
‗gender‘ has come to replace the use of the term ‗sex‘ in ordinary social 
discourse‖ (8).  What she means is that almost every time people use the word 
gender what they mean is sex; the word gender refers to the person‘s physical 
body and whether or not it is ‗male‘ or ‗female‘ (categories that are also 
understood through the folk perspective).  Overall provides examples of this 
use, including questionnaires, forms, political speeches, and non-academic 
publications, all of which use the word gender but most probably mean 




provides can be easily found. A New York Times article, for example, refers to 
a parent as thinking that the recently introduced drug Gardasil was ―a gender-
specific vaccine for a gender-specific disease‖ (Hoffman 2008).  An article 
from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation refers to a test that purports to 
predict ―the gender of a fetus six weeks into pregnancy‖ (CBC News 2007).  
This article concludes by saying that a member of the British Medical 
Association ―recommends waiting for an ultrasound or until the baby is born 
to discover the gender‖ (CBC News 2007).  How does Overall know that the 
authors of such things most likely mean biological sex and not something else 
when they use the word gender? It seems that she knows this simply because 
this interpretation makes the most sense (8 - 9).  Like the examples that 
Overall includes in her article, these statements about the gender of babies and 
fetuses, and illnesses that can be ―gender-specific‖ make sense only if the 
word gender is taken to refer to biological sex: which is exactly the way that 
the folk understanding conceptualizes the two. 
In conclusion, the basic belief of the folk conceptualization of the 
relationship between the concepts SEX and GENDER can be summarized as 
follows: 
Folk Conceptualization: 
The concepts SEX and GENDER both involve the 
reproductive type of a person‘s body. 
 
 
2.3 Comments about the audience 
Since the relationship between SEX and GENDER can be interpreted in these 
three different ways (and maybe in more still), my statement that my argument 




Someone who approaches these topics from the earlier perspective would 
likely accept the distinction I make, and think it completely possible that the 
multidimensional model might have something important to say about sex, but 
nothing to add to the topic of gender. Someone who espouses the later 
conceptualization, on the other hand, would most likely deny that I could 
speak about sex in the absence of gender.  In fact, from the perspective of the 
later conceptualization, my reconceptualization of sex would likely seem to be 
further proof of the constructive force that its proponents believe gender to be.  
My proposing a reconceptualization would be taken to be evidence of gender 
at work.  Lastly, someone who understands sex and gender from the 
perspective of the folk conceptualization would also reject my distinction 
between the two, but for a different reason.  With the folk conceptualization, 
sex is gender (and gender is sex), so my claim that I will be speaking about 
one but not the other makes about as much sense as to say that I am 
reconceptualizing bachelors, but have nothing to say about unmarried men.   
I can anticipate how proponents of the later conceptualization and of the 
folk conceptualization would respond to my statement that my 
reconceptualization is about sex but not gender.  Anyone who espouses either 
of these views would say:  No, it is not possible to speak about one and not the 
other.  To them, I would reply:  Yes, it is, and the next section will explain 
how.     
 
 
2.4 Two features of concepts 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Murphy (2002) explains that a concept of x is that 
group of information that comes to a person‘s mind when that person thinks 




particular collection of information that I have in mind when I think about 
apples.  It includes such elements as {kind of fruit}, {has stems}, {contains 
seeds}, {grows on trees}, {usually tastes sweet} and a vague image of an 
apple.  These informational elements, in combination, are my concept APPLE.   
When two or more people are engaged in a conversation, the informational 
elements of whatever concepts are relevant to the discussion can be divided 
into types: what can be called shared and private informational elements.  If a 
particular informational element is common to two or more interlocutors‘ 
concepts of x, then it is a shared element;  if the informational element is not 
shared with anyone else participating in the conversation then it is a private 
informational element. How a particular informational element will be 
classified will always depend upon certain features of the conversational 
context in which the concept is being called to mind: specifically, the 
informational elements of the interlocutors‘ concepts.   
Consider a group of four people who are discussing apples.  If we assume 
that these four people have all had experience with apples, then each person‘s 
concept is likely to include the five informational elements of my concept 
APPLE (described above), as these elements stem from typical experiences with 
apples (as opposed to specialist knowledge of apples, or unique experiences, 
as will be discussed).  In this conversation, these five informational elements 
are shared conceptual elements.  If we also assume that each of these four 
people has had their own non-typical experiences with apples then there is 
likely to be private informational elements as well.  Perhaps one person, like 
Snow White, became violently ill after taking a bite from an apple.  This 
individual‘s concept APPLE would contain the informational element {can 
cause stomach aches}, or something similar.  Assuming that only this 
individual has had this experience, then in this conversational context {can 




other personal histories that could cause the other three members of the 
conversation to each have private elements in their concept APPLE, such as 
{good gift for teachers}, or {too tempting for Eve}, or {best for Fall pies}.  
These four different conceptualizations are represented in the figure below 
(Fig. 2-1). 
 
2-1 Four conceptualizations of APPLE  
Separate representations of four conceptualizations of APPLE  indicating the 
informational elements each includes.   
 
APPLE1 
Person #1‘s concept APPLE 
 {kind of fruit} 
{grows on trees} 
{has stems} 
{usually tastes sweet} 
{can cause stomach aches} 
[mental image1] 
APPLE2 
Person #2‘s concept APPLE 
 {kind of fruit} 
{grows on trees} 
{has stems} 
{usually tastes sweet} 
{best for fall pies} 
[mental image2] 
APPLE4 
Person #4‘s concept APPLE 
 {kind of fruit} 
{grows on trees} 
{has stems} 
{usually tastes sweet} 
{good gift for teachers} 
[mental image4] 
APPLE3 
Person #3‘s concept APPLE 
 {kind of fruit} 
{grows on trees} 
{has stems} 
{usually tastes sweet} 





What would happen if these four individuals became engaged in a 
conversation about apples?  The success of their communication would 
depend upon the number of informational elements that are shared between 
these four conceptualizations (see Figure 2-2, below).  For two or more people 
to communicate about apples, then between the different conceptualizations 
there must be at least one shared informational element.  Without at least one 
shared informational element common to both people‘s concept of whatever is 
being discussed the conversation will quickly fizzle and both will walk away 
shaking their heads, wondering what happened. Without some shared 
informational elements it will never be clear if two or more people are 
communicating about the same thing.   
Additionally, the more shared elements there are between these two people‘s 
conceptualizations of APPLE, the easier communication about apples will be 
between them.  The fact that each person‘s conceptualization also involves 
private informational elements may or may not ever affect the conversation, as 
the conversation might not ever require that these elements be brought up.  
Any concept that becomes relevant to a conversation between two or more 
people will have either private or shared elements, or both.  This dissertation 
engages the concepts BIOLOGICAL SEX, MALE, and FEMALE,  and must 
recognize that the way these are conceptualized will not be the same for all.  
Not being the same for all, however, does not mean they are not the same at 
all.  In the remainder of this chapter I will show that even if there is 
disagreement about the relationship between sex and gender (as there 
obviously is, given the three perspectives described above), there is still 
enough common ground between the different conceptualizations of sex to 








2-2 Four conceptualizations of APPLE and the resulting shared features 
This image represents the four concepts represented in figure 2-1, but now 
engaged together.  This engagement sorts out the shared informational 
elements from the private.  Shared informational elements for this hypothetical 
conversation are included in the shared space located in the middle of the 
picture.  Private elements are those which are not included in the overlapping 













2.5 Is my concept to your concept as apples are to 
oranges? 
If three people, each holding one of three conceptualizations of SEX and 
GENDER in mind, were to have a conversation about gender, what would be the 
shared informational elements of this exchange?  With respect to GENDER, I 
think the answer would be that there are no informational elements that would 
be shared across all three perspectives.  The first step in seeing why this is so 
is to identify the conceptual elements each would likely associate with the 
concept GENDER.   
Recalling Nicholson‘s (1998) and Friedman‘s (1996) descriptions of the 
earlier conceptualization, one can assume that this understanding would 
associate informational elements such as {pairs with sex}, {nonphysical}, 
{changeable}, {affects or causes behavior}, and {divides into masculinity and 
femininity}.   
The later conceptualization would also likely lead to association of the  
informational elements {nonphysical} and {affects or causes behavior}.  It 
would not, however, lead to the association of {pairs with sex}.  The later 
understanding holds that gender creates or facilitates sex, meaning that it is 
through a gendered perception that people understand sex at all.  This 
particular idea would introduce an element something like {facilitates any 
understanding of sex} that the earlier perspective certainly would not.  
Therefore, it seems that between the earlier and the later conceptualizations 
only {nonphysical} and {affects or causes behavior} would be shared 
elements. These two elements constitute the common ground between these 
two conceptualizations of GENDER (see Figure 2-3, below). 
The folk understanding‘s concept GENDER, it seems to me, would not 
associate either of these elements.  This perspective could not make sense of a 




understood to be nothing more than the latter.  Upon analysis, it turns out that 
the folk understanding might actually take gender to be nothing more than an 
informational element of the concept SEX (see Figure 2-4).  As such, it would 
be incoherent if {nonphysical} were included, and {affects or causes 
behavior} would be associated only with the understanding that gender as sex 
affects behavior; this understanding is of course at odds with both the earlier 
and the later conceptualizations of GENDER.    
 
One could argue that the different conceptualizations of gender held by the 
three perspectives share an informational element something like {bears some 
relationship to sex}. This element, however, does not say much as there is no 
agreement about what form that relationship actually takes.  Without 
agreement regarding the type of relationship, this particular informational 
element is not sufficiently unambiguous to pick out gender from all those 
 
 
2-3 Conceptualizations of GENDER 
Representation of the shared and private informational elements of GENDER 
as it is understood by the earlier and later conceptualizations. The folk 
conceptualization is not included here because it would not associate any 

















things that bear some relationship (any relationship) to sex.  This single 
element, therefore, is not enough to establish that the earlier, the later, and the 
folk understanding‘s concept of gender all refer to the same thing.   
 
This analysis, I believe, suggests that there is no cross-perspective 
agreement about what gender is.  Because of there is no shared understanding, 
I think it must be concluded that there is no generic conceptualization of 




2-4 Conceptualizations of BIOLOGICAL SEX 
Representation of the shared and private informational elements of SEX, as it 




What I hope this discussion shows is that there is a foundation for cross-
perspective communication about SEX, and thus, that it is possible for 
proponents of all of these conceptualizations to communicate about SEX in the 
absence of GENDER.  The existence of just two shared features certainly does 
not guarantee that communication will be easy or without disagreement, but it 
does suggest that it is possible for the three perspectives to agree, in general, 
that they are speaking about the same thing.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented three conceptualizations of the relationship 
between the concepts SEX and GENDER in order to clarify the focus of the 
multidimensional model of SEX.  This model does not consider such things as 
sexual orientation (such as homosexuality or heterosexuality), gender identity 
(such as man or woman), or any other psychological or social category related 
to sex.  The model focuses on biological sex itself – a focus that means 
different things to different people. 
As this chapter has shown, there are three general conceptualizations of the 
relationship between SEX and GENDER:  (1) the earlier conceptualization, (2) 
the later conceptualization, and (3) the folk conceptualization.  The earlier and 
the folk conceptualizations could each make sense of a model that focuses 
exclusively on biological sex, although they would have slightly different 
interpretations of what this means.  For someone who conceptualizes SEX and 
GENDER in the way that the later conceptualization does, on the other hand, my 
statement that the multidimensional model is about SEX, but not GENDER, 
demonstrates my misunderstanding of the relationship between these concepts. 
But even if the later conceptualization has it right, and sex cannot be 




conceptualization more accurate while simultaneously doing their best to 
manage the influence and distortion of social and cultural forces.  And if one 
believes that this type of management is impossible, or that no concept can 
ever be more accurate than another, there is still another reason to engage in 
reconceptualization: instead of conceptual accuracy, the process of 
reconceptualization could be justified on the basis of conceptual efficacy.  
Even if we can never know the relative accuracy of different 
conceptualizations, we can know which particular conceptualizations make 
our lives better.  A person can believe that the comparative accuracy of 
different conceptualizations is unknowable, while at the same time believing 
that reconceptualization is important because it can improve human life and 
increase happiness.  This argument will be unpopular with those who think 
that the accuracy of different conceptualizations can be known and judged, but 
it is not intended for them.   My intention with this argument is only to point 
out that even if people believe that a concept‘s accuracy cannot be known, 
they can still think that reconceptualization can be an important endeavour to 
undertake.   
I will have very little else to say about the concept GENDER in the remainder 
of this dissertation.  Although the multidimensional model of sex might have 
interesting and important implications for GENDER (the number of which will 
likely depend upon which of the three conceptualizations one espouses) I will 
not spend any time discussing them.  I will be talking about the physical body 
and its sexual types.  I think that the material discussed in this chapter gives 
good reason to think that it is possible to meaningfully discuss biological sex 
without also discussing gender, no matter what position one holds on the 
latter.  And, in any case, there is reason to think it might be best to avoid 
discussions of gender altogether.  As the previous section demonstrated, there 




actually speaking about the same thing.  The lack of shared elements between 
the three major positions shows that there is likely no shared meaning between 
them, and that the meanings themselves might be incompatible.  Returning to 














This chapter focuses on what will be called the folk understanding of 
biological sex, which is the understanding of sex that is most at odds with the 
multidimensional conceptualization I am putting forward. The folk 
understanding is, simply put, the understanding that most people have of 
biological sex.  In Chapter 1 I very briefly identified and outlined what I see as 
the three basic beliefs of this understanding, which are again: (1) group 
member homogeneity, (2) atomism, and (3) logical opposition.  These basic 
beliefs are at the heart of most people‘s understanding of sex, and this chapter 
will serve to describe them in detail. 
Before beginning this description I want to briefly emphasize that I do not 
claim to know exactly how any one person thinks about biological sex, nor do 
I claim to know how everyone thinks about it.  I acknowledge that there may 




the exact beliefs I will describe in this chapter.  Because of this possibility, it 
needs to be emphasized that the beliefs I am about to discuss should be treated 
as common themes within the folk understanding: ways of thought that are 
held by many, and evidence for which can be found frequently in day-to-day 
activities.  
 
3.2 Evidence of the folk understanding 
One way to gain understanding of the most fundamental beliefs that a group 
of people have about a particular thing is to study how that group interacts 
with that particular thing:  how they speak about it, what they say about it, and 
what sort of role it plays in their day to day lives.  This is, roughly speaking,  
how one creates an ethnography of a culture:  by immersing oneself within the 
group and observing and documenting in order to gain an overall 
understanding of how that particular group of people function, what they 
value, and why they value it.  If a group of ethnographers were to become 
immersed in Western culture, what evidence would they encounter about how 
people think about sex?  What sort of conclusions could they suggest about 
general patterns and themes in these peoples‘ thoughts, and the logic 
suggested by them?  These are the two questions that this section and the next 
will attempt to answer.   
An ethnographer interested in learning about Western society‘s beliefs about 
sex would be inundated with information, since our thoughts about the 
concepts SEX, MALE, and FEMALE are on display throughout society.  Frye 
commented that there is ―a great pressure on each of us to inform everybody 
all the time of our sex‖ (1983b, 23, emphasis in original).  She explains, 
Sex-identification intrudes into every moment of our lives 
and discourse, no matter what the supposedly primary focus 




and redundant marking of a distinction between two sexes 
of humans and most animals is customary and obligatory.  
One never can ignore it. (19, emphasis in original.) 
Frye discusses various examples of some of the ―thousand ways‖ people in 
Western culture ―mark‖ their sex including social behaviours, etiquette, and 
language use, as well as wearing sex-related ―gear and accessories‖ and 
―badges and buttons‖ (19 – 29).  One need only wander through a shopping 
mall to see examples of what Frye is speaking about; in our culture we can 
buy a seemingly infinite number of things to be worn, eaten, placed on the 
body, used on the body, or given to others all of which send (or are at least 
intended to send) the message ―I am female‖ or ―I am male‖ to others.  (In 
some cases these purchased things might be used to reinforce this message to 
oneself as well.)      
It is important to emphasize, as Frye does in the passage above, that this 
process of continuous but indirect display of one‘s sex is closely tied to the 
assumption that one can display a sex that is either male or female.  This 
culture does not react well to ambiguity.  An article that appeared in The 
Toronto Star told the story about a baby, Storm, whose sex had not been 
publicized to the general public (Poisson 2011). The author of the article wrote 
―[w]hile there is nothing ambiguous about Storm‘s genitalia, they [Storm‘s 
parents] aren‘t telling anyone whether their third child is a boy or a girl‖ 
(Poisson 2011).  People had strong reactions to this choice. CNN called the 
family for comment (Newton 2011). Commentators in Canada decided to 
weigh in (Kay 2011, Sommerville 2011); a newspaper asked a Canadian 
musician to weigh in (Jenkins 2011). Within a week of its first appearance, it 
was reported that there were approximately 35000 comments about the story 






 on an early list of the stories shared most often on Facebook 
in the year 2011 (Global News 2011). 
 In addition to clarity, there is also the expectation that whatever sex one 
publicizes is the sex of one‘s own body (again limited to being either male or 
female).  To ―inform‖ others that your sex is one other than what they 
perceive yours to be can be seen as tantamount to deception; because of this, 
attempts to change from one category to another are not well-tolerated in our 
culture at present.  One interesting example of this sort of thinking about sex 
was exhibited in reaction to a case involving sexual categories and pregnancy.  
A few years ago The Oprah Winfrey Show aired an episode entitled ―The 
World‘s First Pregnant Man.‖  The show‘s promotion emphasized the case‘s 
apparently bizarre biology: 
It‘s the story that has the media buzzing and people talking.  
A happily married couple who lives in a normal 
neighborhood in America are expecting their first child.  
But, there‘s a big twist… the husband, Thomas, is the one 
pregnant.  Thomas is here with his wife for their first 
television interview.  How is this possible?  Find out as the 
couple shares with Oprah the details of their pasts, their 
relationship and their incredible pregnancy.  Also, watch as 
our cameras capture Thomas‘s ultrasound and take us inside 
their home to see the plans for the family‘s nursery 
(Oprah.com 2008). 
One ―detail of their past‖ emerged during the episode:  Thomas was a female-
to-male transsexual.  
Many people reacted negatively to this information about Thomas‘s biology.  
One of Oprah‘s viewers, for example, said of Thomas ―[s]he is a woman, and I 
don‘t seem to remember gaining a spot on Oprah or any other talk show when 
I was pregnant with my two sons‖ (Oprah.com 2008).  Another viewer 




a man while pregnant‖ (Oprah.com 2006).  Another viewer facetiously asked 
―I‘m pregnant so if I say I‘m a cat does that mean that I‘ll get to be on 
Oprah?‖ (Oprah.com 2008).  Speaking of Thomas‘ sex, Jeff Jacoby (2008) 
wrote in The International Herald Tribune  
[I]t takes more than a mastectomy and hormone treatments 
to overturn biology.  Thomas may be a man in the eyes of 
the law, but she remains physically a woman, with a 
woman‘s reproductive system, a woman‘s genitals, and a 
woman‘s chromosomes. 
A well-known Canadian academic often asked for comment on controversial 
matters, Margaret Somerville, was quoted as saying ―It‘s a very touchy thing, 
this deconstruction of our biological reality.  Where I would do a reversal on 
this is to say, ‗You‘ve artificially made yourself a man.  You‘re not a man, 
you‘re a woman and you‘re having a baby and you‘re actually having your 
own baby‖ (Gardner 2008). 
The belief in two mutually exclusive sexes is held so deeply in our culture 
that in addition to expecting people to publicize their sex, and to be honest 
about it (within the confines of the two options offered) we also routinely 
divide people according to their reproductive category. One such practice that 
has begun to draw attention is the mixing of the two recognized sexes in 
hospital rooms.  People have had mixed reactions to some Ontario hospitals 
doing this (Hendry 2011), as have others when it has been tried elsewhere in 
Canada (Dobrovnik 2010).  Hospitals in the United Kingdom have also been 
criticized for placing male individuals and female individuals in the same 
ward room together  (Burnett 2011).  The Executive Director of the Registered 
Nurses‘ Association of Ontario wrote a letter speaking out against the mixing 
of people with different anatomies in the same hospital room on the grounds 
that the practice can threaten ―safety, privacy, and dignity‖ (Grinspun 2010).  




construction.  To be lawful and ―up to code‖ builders must take into account 
the sexual category (again, assumed to be either male or female) of those who 
will be using the building (Building Code Act 1992. Ontario Regulation 
350/06).   
What might be the thinking underlying these interests, reactions, and 
requirements?  What biological and/or social rules, exactly, are the rule-
breakers perceived to be breaking? What conceptualizations of SEX, MALE, and 
FEMALE underlie these attitudes?  What basic beliefs do these behaviours 
indicate?  The following three sections will outline three beliefs which, I 
believe, form the basic assumptions behind the examples just provided. 
 
 
3.3 Three basic beliefs of the folk understanding 
3.3.1 Belief #1:  Group member homogeneity 
The ―group members‖ that the belief in group member homogeneity refer to 
are those people who are placed in either the category ‗male‘ or the category 
‗female‘ by all the sorts of divisions just spoken of.  To say that these group 
members are assumed to be homogeneous means simply that it is believed that 
all females are the same in terms of their being female (i.e., their 
―femaleness‖), and that all males are the same in terms of their being male 
(i.e., their ―maleness‖).  This belief is likely behind the thinking of those who 
favour sex-separated hospital rooms;  the assumption seems to be that any two 
females can share a room because their femaleness will be the same, and any 
two males can share a room because their maleness will be the same.   
What does it mean to say that individual males are believed to be alike in 




terms of their ―femaleness‖?  By this I mean that any female is thought to be 
as female as any other female, and any male is thought to be as male as any 
other male.  If this seems unclear, consider that I am using each of the words 
female and male in two different ways here:  to refer to a type of individual on 
one hand, and a type of quality or characteristic on the other.  To clarify the 
different uses, the word femaleness can be used to refer to the quality or 
characteristic of being female. Saying that members of the category ‗female‘ 
are thought to be homogeneous means that any individual female is thought to 
have as much femaleness as any other female. (And, of course, the 
corresponding belief is that any individual male is thought to possess as much 
maleness as any other male.)  According to the folk understanding, if two 
people are both female, then they are female to the same degree;  if they are 
both male, then they are male to the same degree.  Were it otherwise, 
insistence on same-sex hospital rooms or public washrooms would make little 
sense.  (A likely objection to this characterization is anticipated and discussed 
in the next section.) 
 
3.3.2 Belief #2:  Atomistic structure 
The belief in atomism is nothing more than the belief that maleness and 
femaleness cannot be gauged or measured;  they are either completely present 
or completely absent.  Each exists as a single, indivisible quality that a person 
either does or does not possess.  
To better understand what I mean when I say that the folk understanding 
takes sex to be atomistic, one can try to imagine a quality called ―male 
existence‖ and another called ―female existence.‖  Without knowing exactly 
what either of these things are, nor whether these qualities are physical, 




possibility of their division.  For example, one can ask, can a person have just 
part of ―female existence‖?  One can also ask, is it possible for a person to 
have only half of the complete ―male existence‖?  I think most people would 
say that the answer to both of these questions is no: the general feeling 
operating within the folk understanding is that any male is a male without 
qualification, and any female is a female without qualification.  Maleness and 
femaleness, in the folk understanding, are always unmitigated.   
The connection between the belief in atomistic structure and the belief in 
group member homogeneity is easy to see.  Because maleness and femaleness 
are assumed to be simple qualities (i.e., qualities that are indivisible and 
composed of no parts), anyone who possesses one of them will be thought to 
possess it just as much as anyone else.  All males will be equally male, and all 
females will be equally female; things cannot be otherwise if the qualities of 
maleness and femaleness are simple and indivisible.  
Some might argue against my description of this particular belief.  Someone 
might ask me:  if people assume all females are the same with respect to their 
femaleness, and that femaleness itself is an all-or-nothing thing, why do I 
recognize some people as being more female than others? (The same question 
could be asked about males and maleness.)  To this concern, I would say that 
the first important task is to identify and clarify those features that are being 
considered important when the sex of others is identified.  Returning to the 
three conceptualizations from the previous chapter can help to do this. 
 Chapter Two outlined three different interpretations of the relationship 
between SEX and GENDER: the earlier, the later, and the folk 
conceptualizations.  People who espouse the folk understanding of sex will 
most likely take the third of these perspectives, which does not recognize a 




is being made, then any difference between members of the same folk-
categories can be attributed to sex and sex alone.  However, if one were to 
take a position more like the earlier conceptualization, a position which takes 
SEX and GENDER to be different, then one has more options.  Once SEX and 
GENDER are distinguished, it could be seen that what one is observing is a 
difference in gender (i.e., how manly or womanly, masculine or feminine the 
person is), but not in sex (i.e., how male or female the person is).  There is an 
important difference between the beliefs that there are more womanly women 
and more manly men, and the beliefs that there are more male males and more 
female females.  To see this difference, one can consider how one could go 
about altering these things.  To be more ―womanly,‖ for example, I could try 
to take up less physical space, speak with a higher pitch, paint my fingernails 
and wear pink;  but what could I possibly do to become ―more female‖?  It is 
even more difficult to imagine what I could do to make myself less female, or 
even not female.  I think that someone who holds the folk conceptualization of 
the relationship between SEX and GENDER would likely say that there is 
nothing I can do to accomplish any of these things:  I just am female, and it is 
out of my hands.   
 
3.3.3 Belief #3:  Logical opposition 
This third belief of the folk understanding, which will be detailed in this 
section, is that the concepts MALE and FEMALE are logically opposed.  Of the 
three basic beliefs being presented here, this is the one that is most likely to be 
explicitly stated by proponents of the folk understanding because it has to do 
with the relationship between the two sexual categories that the folk 




According to what is called the law of non-contradiction, something cannot 
simultaneously both be the case and not be the case.  For example, if I were to 
say ―Today is my birthday and it is not my birthday‖ I would be breaking the 
law of non-contradiction.  It is either my birthday, or it is not my birthday 
today; because of the meaning of the word birthday, today cannot be both. The 
law of non-contradiction expresses this idea more formally by saying that 
something cannot be both A and ~A at the same time. 
Before discussing the law of non-contradiction in relation to sex, I will 
apply it to different concepts that have a similar relationship as MALE and 
FEMALE do to each other within the folk understanding:  ODD NUMBER and 
EVEN NUMBER.  Consider the statements (A) ―The number ‗7‘ is an odd 
number and an even number‖ and (B) ―The number ‗7‘ is fuzzy and fun.‖  
Statement (A) violates the law of non-contradiction.  Although statement (B) 
is clearly false and might be pure nonsense, it does not violate the law of non-
contradiction.  To see why this is the case, one must consider the elements of 
each statement.  Statement (A) can be decomposed into the components ―The 
number ‗7‘ is an odd number‖ and ―The number ‗7‘ is an even number.‖  
Statement (B) can be decomposed into the components ―The number ‗7‘ is 
fuzzy‖ and ―The number ‗7‘ is fun.‖ Once the statements are decomposed in 
this way, their logical structure can be represented as follows: 
STATEMENT (A) 
The number „7‟ 
is an even number. 
The number „7‟ 
is an odd number. 
  








The number „7‟ 
is fuzzy. 
The number „7‟ 
is fun. 
  
A               &              B 
 
Statement (A) takes the form A & ~A because of the relationship between the 
meaning of the terms even number and odd number. Statement (B), on the 
other hand, ends up having the structure A & B because of the relationship (or 
lack thereof) between the meaning of the terms fuzzy and fun.  The categories 
‗odd number‘ and ‗even number‘ are logically opposed to one another; 
something that can be categorized as one cannot be categorized as the other as 
well.  If one knows what an even number is and what an odd number is, then 
one also knows that a number that is even cannot also be odd, and a number 
that is odd cannot also be even.  The categories ‗fuzzy‘ and ‗fun,‘ on the other 
hand, do not have this type of relationship.  One‘s knowledge of a thing‘s 
being fun is unaffected by one‘s knowledge of a thing‘s fuzziness, and vice 
versa.  So, if two terms are known to be logically opposed, then it is known 
that the presence of one signals the absence of the other. 
When understood from the perspective of the folk understanding, the 
categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ bear the same sort of relationship to each other 
as the categories ‗odd number‘ and ‗even number‘ do to one another.  The folk 
understanding takes the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ to be logically 
opposed, which means that people who understand categories of sex in this 
way take {not female} to be an informational element of the concept MALE 
and {not male} to be an informational element of the concept FEMALE.   
To illustrate this particular relationship, consider the statement (C) ―Bob is 




components ―Bob is female‖ and ―Bob is male.‖  Representation of this 
statement‘s logical structure reveals that, in the view of the folk 
understanding, it is the same as the statement ―The number ‗7‘ is an odd 
number and an even number,‖ which is A & ~A:   
STATEMENT (C) 
Bob is female. Bob is male. 
  
              A                 &              ~A 
 
Statement (C) has the same logical structure as statement (A) because they 
each include a pair of logically opposed categories.  However, if the categories 
‗male‘ and ‗female‘ were not taken to be logically opposed (as they are under 
the folk understanding) then statement (C) would be as acceptable as 
statement (B) which includes simple conjunction (as is in Statement (D), 
below). 
STATEMENT (D) 
Bob is female. Bob is male. 
  
              A                 &                 B 
 
This belief that the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ are opposed has two 
important implications.  First, a person‘s sex will be thought to have epistemic 
import;  with the folk understanding, knowing someone‘s sex is knowing more 
than the simple fact that the person ―is female‖ or ―is male.‖  Because of the 
belief in logical opposition, knowing that a person is male or is female brings 
with it the knowledge that the person is either not female and not male, 




brings with it the knowledge that it is not an even number, knowing a person‘s 
sex brings with it the knowledge that that person is not of the other sex.  
The second important implication is that, according to the folk 
understanding, no person can be both male and female at the same time (and 
maybe not even at separate times). Because of the assumption of logical 
opposition (perhaps in combination with the belief in atomistic structure), the 
folk understanding of sex cannot make sense of simultaneous maleness and 
femaleness in the same person.  A person being both male and female could 
only be understood as someone who is both male and not-male, female and 
not-female, at the same time; to understand a person‘s sex in this way, of 
course, is not to understand that person‘s sex at all (at least by the standards of 
the folk understanding). 
The belief in logical opposition can perhaps explain some of the reactions to 
Thomas Beattie‘s situation, which was described above.  Although Thomas 
interpreted himself as a man, others interpreted him as a woman (once they 
had been told about his history);  since one cannot be both a woman and a man 
(i.e. both male and female) within the folk understanding, someone had to be 
mistaken.  Kate Bornstein‘s (2003) explanation of transsexual experience in 
this culture supports this interpretation.  Bornstein writes: 
through it‘s [sic] insistence and fierce maintenance of the 
man/woman dichotomy, the culture puts the prechange 
transsexual in the position of needing to say a permanent 
good-bye to one gender, and then and only then say hello to 
another.  While that good-bye/hello is certainly an option, 
this culture is making it the only option. (43)   
As will be argued later in Chapter 4, this sort of thinking also reflects 
essentialist assumptions about biological sex (i.e. the belief that there is a 





In this chapter I have provided a description of the most basic beliefs that can 
be associated with the folk understanding of biological sex.  This chapter has 
aimed to be non-critical of the folk understanding, and whether or not these 
beliefs are accurate has yet to be answered.  A lot depends upon this 
evaluation.  If it turns out that the folk understanding is mistaken about these 
three beliefs, then there will be a reason to seek alternatives.  Given the 
motivation people have to hold on to their understandings of sex and the risk 
that reconceptualization poses to personal identity, establishing the need to 
reconceptualise is of utmost importance. The discussion will turn, in the next 















Now that the three basic beliefs of the folk understanding have been 
described, the question of their accuracy can be addressed.  To begin this 
discussion, I will describe how the folk understanding of biological sex 
provides a good example of what is called ―psychological essentialism.‖  I will 
then discuss the relationship between psychological and metaphysical 
essentialism in order to show that an argument against the latter is an 
argument against the former by virtue of the relationship that exists between 
them.  I will then proceed to present three arguments that aim to show that 
essentialism about sex, and thereby the three beliefs of the folk understanding, 




4.2 The folk understanding and essentialism 
Susan Gelman describes psychological essentialism generally as ―a 
reasoning heuristic‖ (2009, 124), and more specifically as ―any folk theory of 
concepts positing that members of a category have a property or attribute 
(essence) that determines their identity‖ (Gelman 2001).  Gelman and 
Wellman (1991) also describe the essence in terms of its psychological 
function, saying it ―is the unique, typically hidden property of an object that 
makes it what it is, without which it would have a different identity‖ (215).  
Elsewhere, Gelman (2009) describes it as ―an immutable feature or 
substance… that causes category members to be what they are and have the 
properties that they do‖ (124).   
The thoughts and associated logic I have described in the previous chapter 
suggest that the folk understanding of sex is a form of psychological 
essentialism. The three commitments of the folk understanding (group 
member homogeneity, atomism, and logical opposition) presuppose the 
existence of something that has an atomistic structure, and the possession of 
which can create a meaningful group of people that is logically opposed to 
some other meaningful group of people.  Within the folk understanding this 
thing that is presupposed by the three commitments is the essence (either of 
maleness or femaleness).  
Many authors note that psychological essentialism is an observation about 
what people believe exists, not an observation or claim about what things do 
exist (Gelman 2001; Medin 1989, 1477; Gelman and Wellman 1991, 229; 
Gelman 2009, 124).  Belief in something, most people well know, does not 
establish its existence, no matter the intensity of one‘s belief in that thing.  So, 
even though the folk understanding‘s commitment to two distinct sexual 
essences is strong, the strength of this belief offers no evidence for the 




example of psychological essentialism is only to point out something about 
how a group (in this case, ―the folk‖) thinks about a certain thing (in this case, 
biological sex). 
While claims about the role that beliefs about essences play in people‘s 
understanding of the world are taken up by psychologists, claims about 
whether or not essences actually do exist are taken up by philosophers.  But 
this is not to say that they agree about this matter.  Plato, for one, thought that 
essences existed.  In the dialogue Parmenides, for example, Plato (1997) 
suggests that things ―come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by 
getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice 
and beauty‖ (131a, 364).
2
  For Plato, people recognize individual things as 
being of a certain type of thing because they exhibit essences of those types; 
for Plato, it is the essence that we recognize.  If Platonists were to consider 
biological sex, they would say that some people are male because they (to use 
Plato‘s language) ―get a share‖ of the essence of being male (i.e., maleness), 
and other people are female because they ―get a share‖ of the essence of being 
female (i.e., femaleness).  Other philosophers would deny the existence of 
male and female (and any other) essences.  Richard Rorty ([1994] 1999) for 
example suggests what he calls ―panrelationalism‖ in place of essentialism 
(52).  To explain his position, he says, ―ask what the essence of the number 17 
is – what it is in itself, apart from its relationships to other numbers‖ (52).  
Rorty‘s point is that one cannot attempt to identify the essential feature(s) of 
number 17 (or of any other number for that matter) without also discussing 
other numbers (53).  Rorty, therefore, would deny Plato‘s suggestion that the 
number 17 is recognized as such because it ―gets a share‖ of the essence of 17.  
In a description of his own antiessentialist position and those who share it, he 
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 In his introduction to this dialogue, Cooper (1997) states that ―if Plato has a ‗spokesman‘ 




states: ―We suggest that you think of all such objects as resembling numbers 
in the following respect:  there is nothing to be known about them except an 
initially large, and forever expandable, web of relations to other objects‖ (53).  
A similar argument could easily be made with regards to biological sex.  It is 
possible to ask what maleness is ―in itself,‖ but is it possible to give an 
(accurate) answer that does not refer somehow to femaleness, and vice versa?  
If it is not, then perhaps maleness and femaleness are relationally defined, 
rather than essentially. 
In the sections that follow in this chapter I will present and discuss three 
reasons to think that male and female essences do not exist.  These reasons 
will also serve to weaken the folk understanding because of the relationship 
that exists between the type of essentialism Plato and Rorty comment on, and 
the type of essentialism authors like Gelman are interested in.  Beliefs about x 
presume the existence of x; but if there is good reason to think that x does not 
in fact exist, then there is also good reason to think that beliefs about x are 
flawed at this most basic level (i.e., at the level of existence).  Because this 
relationship exists between the two types of essentialism, the three reasons I 
am about to present work against both forms. 
 
4.2.1 First challenge: species, sex, and their evolutionary histories 
The most compelling reason to think that essentialist thinking about sex is 
wrong becomes apparent when one considers the dominant theoretical position 
in current biological thought. Charles Darwin‘s theory of evolution and 
thoughts that have followed from it deny the belief that there are essences that 
qualitatively delineate living things.  In rejecting essentialist thought, 
Darwin‘s theory relocated human beings from their elevation above all other 




the first chapter of Darwin‘s  ([1879] 2004) The Descent of Man he provides 
an examination of physical similarities between human beings and other living 
creatures.  The goal of that chapter, in Darwin‘s words, is to show ―how far 
the bodily structure of man shows traces more or less plain, of his descent 
from some lower form‖ (22).  Darwin provides numerous examples in support 
of this claim, ranging from a description of baboons sick from drinking too 
much alcohol the previous night (24), to curious human features such as 
wisdom teeth (37) and relatively sparse body hair in comparison with other 
mammals (36).  He concludes the chapter by saying: 
Thus we can understand how it has come to pass that man 
and all other vertebrate animals have been constructed on 
the same general model, why they pass through the same 
early stages of development and why they retain certain 
rudiments in common.  Consequently, we ought frankly to 
admit their community of descent. (43) 
Admitting this, Darwin explains, also means accepting that human beings are 
not descended from ―demi-gods‖ as others before him had thought (43).  
Consider this statement of Darwin‘s ((1859) 2006) that he includes toward the 
end of his Origin of Species:  
 Hereafter we shall be compelled to acknowledge that the 
only distinction between species and well-marked varieties 
is, that the latter are known, or believed, to be connected at 
the present day by intermediate gradations, whereas species 
were formerly thus connected.  (304)  
Darwin is here stating that people‘s judgment that two presently existing 
creatures are (and always have been) essentially different species arises from 
their overlooking the whole history of that species.  Put plainly, having one‘s 
understanding arrested at the present affects judgments and perceptions about 





Although it tends to be overlooked, Darwin had similar things to say about  
the continuity between maleness and femaleness.  In fact sex and sexual 
activity were two features that Darwin used to draw connections between 
human beings and other living creatures.  Of sex as an activity, for example, 
Darwin ([1879] 2004) notes that ―[t]he whole process... is strikingly the same 
in all mammals‖ (24).  Of the individual sexes, Darwin writes, ―[m]an differs 
from woman in size, bodily strength, hairiness, &c., as well as in mind, in the 
same manner as do the two sexes of many mammals‖ (25).  Other passages 
from Darwin‘s ([1879] 2004) Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex 
suggest that he rejects essentialism about sex just as he rejects essentialism 
about species.  For example, Darwin states that ―some remote progenitor of 
the whole vertebrate kingdom appears to have been hermaphrodite or 
androgynous‖ ([1879] 2004, 189).  (In a footnote to the preceding statement, 
Darwin attributes this idea to Gegenbaur, 1870, s. 876.)  Darwin‘s comments 
on rudiments related to sex also emphasize continuity between the sexes.  He 
says, ―Here we are not concerned with the vestige of a part which does not 
belong to the species, in an efficient state, but with a part efficient in the one 
sex, and represented in the other by a mere rudiment‖ (41).  Darwin highlights 
that the modern human male body contains some rudimentary versions of 
elements of the female reproductive system, as well as rudimentary mammary 
glands (41-42, 188-189).  In relation to the latter, Darwin suggests that ―long 
after the progenitors of the whole mammalian class had ceased to be 
androgynous both sexes yielded milk, and thus nourished their young‖ (190).   
Someone immersed in the folk understanding might object that Darwin was 
speaking, in these passages, about such an enormous amount of time that his 
comments do not bear on his thinking about the modern human sexes and 
whether or not they are essentially different (and therefore, that these passages 




argue that whether or not human beings had a hermaphroditic ancestor 
(Darwin uses the word ―androgynous‖ in the quotation selected here) millions 
of years ago is irrelevant to whether or not males and females are essentially 
different today.   
To address this criticism it is important to note that Darwin viewed the 
evolution of species as beginning with a common ancestor that branched into 
different forms, each form developed further and then branched into other 
forms again, and each of those forms developed further, etc.  This branching 
and developing has been going on for such a long period of time that we, as 
human beings, have a difficult time appreciating this.  If we focus on what is 
in front of us now, it seems as if there really are essentially different, totally 
disconnected species.  It is, for example, difficult to believe that at some point 
in the past there existed some living thing that, following one evolutionary 
path, evolved into a tiger, and following another evolutionary path, evolved 
into us.  What could this common ancestor have been?   
It is important to note, however, that what is the case is not determined by 
what can be understood to be the case: human history is not determined by the 
capability of human imagination, nor by what any particular group can 
appreciate at a particular time.  If our mental capabilities were such that we 
could imagine the larger picture which includes a history that extends further 
back than the history of our own species, we would see that there are common 
threads all leading back in time to a shared beginning, and that our impression 
that species are distinct, is false. Understanding these basic notions of 
evolution is an imaginative exercise, because we, as human beings, cannot 
experience all of evolutionary history directly.  If the imagination is not used, 
and immediate experience is all that is given consideration, then one might be 




To better understand the effect that perception can have on the impression of 
continuity (or discontinuity) between species, one can consider a suggestion 
made by David Hull (1965a, 1965b, 2001).  In his two-part 1965 paper ―The 
Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy – Two Thousand Years of Stasis,‖ Hull 
argued that the concept SPECIES cannot be properly defined by an appeal to a 
single essential property.  Hull‘s (1965b) conclusion in this paper is that 
SPECIES can be given no better than a disjunctive definition such as the 
following:  
1. consistently interbreed producing a reasonably large 
proportion of reasonably fertile offspring, or 
2. consistently serially interbreed with synchronic 
populations producing a reasonably large proportion of 
reasonably fertile offspring, or 
3. do not fulfil either of the first two conditions but have 
not diverged appreciably from a common ancestry 
which did fulfil one of them, or 
4. do not fulfil any of the first three conditions because 
they do not apply but are analogous to populations 
which do fulfil at least one of the first three conditions. 
(13) 
For this definition, because it is disjunctive, Hull says, ―the fulfilling of any 
one of the conditions is sufficient and the fulfilling of at least one is 
necessary‖ (13, Hull's emphasis).  In a later work, Hull (2001) states that this 
sort of definition is actually not very helpful, as 
[o]nce the amount of labour necessary to use cluster 
analysis is expended, it works only for contemporaneous 
time-slices of those species that exhibit a unimodal 
distribution – a single bell curve around a single mean.  But 
many species exhibit multimodal distributions.  Which 
characteristics are ‗typical‘ varies from geographic location 




single cluster obliterates an important feature of biological 
species. (206, Hull's emphasis) 
Hull‘s explanation here focuses on other matters, but his statement about 
―contemporaneous time-slices‖ is most important for the current discussion.  
Figure 4-1 (below) illustrates the importance that looking at a ―time-slice‖ can 
have on one‘s understanding of things and the differences between them.  
Each black square in Figure 4-1 represents a modern species.  Because only 
the present variation of these species is the focus, it appears that these species 
are distinct from one another.  However, if a different ―time-slice‖ were 
chosen then a different set of species would become the focus, and they would 
appear to be distinctly different as well (see Figure 4-2, below).   
 
 
4-1 Present species  “time slice” 
Representation of a “time-slice” as mentioned by Hull (2001, 206).  In this image 
different species are represented by black squares, and their evolutionary 
history is represented by grey branches leading back in time.  Part of Hull‟s point 
seems to be that to recognize a group as a species (even disjunctively 
defined), one must focus on a single point of time (such as the present, as this 











A similar case can be made in relation to sex.  It is known individual species 
can evolve both from a hermaphroditic state and to a hermaphroditic state 
(Ghiselin 1969, 189; 2006, 368).  Along each branch of this evolutionary tree, 
then, one could find a species that, at some point, was otherwise (sexually 
speaking).  For any species then, the assumption that it is distinctly different 
from any and all other species, and that its sexes are distinctly different from 
one another would be weakened substantially if one were able to understand 
all of its history at once (rather than appreciating just a single ―time-slice‖ of 
that history). 
   
 
 
4-2 Older species “time-slice” 
Representation of a “time-slice” view of species, as described by Hull (2001, 
206).  This image represents the same evolutionary processes as those that are 
included in figure 4-1.  In this image, however, the “time-slice” is further back in 
time, and so different, and fewer, groups are identified as species.  This 













So, to say that the evolutionary past is irrelevant to the present differences 
between species and sexes is anthropocentric in a way that evolutionary 
theorists would likely reject. Biological science‘s rejection of 
anthropocentrism is not simply methodological, but also epistemological.  
Biology is not concerned with just human biology nor with just present 
biology.  To arbitrarily choose a ―time-slice,‖ and by doing so ignore the 
evolutionary history of that species, is a way of thinking about the matter that 
is not compatible with evolutionary theory.   
 
4.2.2 Second challenge: the gametic definition of sex 
This section will discuss a second reason to think that essentialism about sex 
is wrong: specifically, the combination of the facts that the biological 
understanding of sex takes (1) sexual types to be determined by the gamete 
cells (sperm or egg) that an individual produces, and (2) the differences 
between these types of cells to be quantitative.   
Unlike the folk understanding of sex, the biological understanding 
recognizes three different reproductive types.  The following are definitions of 




Male: (2) (Denoting) an individual organism whose 
reproductive organs produce only male gametes. (Martin 
and Hine 2008c) 
Female: (2) (Denoting) an individual organism whose 
reproductive organs produce only female gametes. (Martin 
and Hine 2008a) 
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 The first and second definitions (―Male‖ and ―Female‖) omit the first meaning that the 
dictionary includes because it identifies gamete type, rather than the reproductive type of an 




Hermaphrodite: (1) An animal, such as the earthworm, that 
has both male and female reproductive organs. (2) A plant 
whose flowers contain both stamens and carpels.  This is the 
usual arrangement in most plants. (Martin and Hine, 
hermaphrodite 2008b) 
What is particularly interesting about these definitions is that they describe the 
concepts MALE, FEMALE, and HERMAPHRODITE by reference to the role or 
potential role that the individual has in reproduction.  For the biological 
understanding, then, sex-as-an-activity is closely related to sex-as-a-type.  The 
sexual types identified by the biological understanding are differentiated 
according to the gamete cell(s) that each produces (i.e., sperm or egg cells).   
To appreciate the problems that a gametic definition of sex causes for the 
folk understanding, three questions seem to need answers.  First, in what way 
or ways is a sperm cell different from an egg cell?  Second, what are the 
similarities between all egg cells, such that ‗egg cell‘ is a coherent category? 
And third, what are the similarities between all sperm cells, such that ‗sperm 
cell‘ is itself a coherent category?  The answers to these questions, especially 
for someone who holds the folk understanding, are probably disappointing.  
The following are definitions, also from A Dictionary of Biology of the 
different types of cells: 
Female 
Denoting the gamete (sex cell) that, during sexual 
reproduction fuses with a male gamete in the process of 
fertilization.  Female gametes are generally larger than the 
male gametes and immotile. (Martin and Hine 2008a) 
 
Male 
Denoting the gamete (sex cell) that, during sexual 




fertilization.  Male gametes are generally smaller than the 
female gametes and are usually motile. (Martin and Hine 
2008c) 
The reason these definitions are likely disappointing is because they pick out 
no essential property of either MALE or FEMALE.  The difference between 
males and females is based upon the type of cells that each produces, and the 
cell-types themselves are understood to be relative. 
The biological understanding, then, can be said to provide a gametic 
definition of SEX:  if an individual produces sperm, that individual is male, if 
the individual produces ova, it is female.  What is particularly important about 
the gametic definition is that gamete types are relatively, but not essentially, 
different. According to this understanding of sex, male and female gametes 
can be understood only by their relationship to one another, much like the 
number 17, as Rorty ([1994] 1999, 52 - 53) suggests, can be understood only 
by appreciating the relationships it has to other numbers.  Because (1) the 
important difference between gamete types is size, and (2) size is relational, 
the biological understanding of SEX does not have, and would not endorse, 
essentialist understandings of MALE and FEMALE. 
 
4.2.3 Third challenge:  the occurrence of intersexuality 
A final consideration will highlight the likelihood that essentialist thinking 
about sex is wrong:  the occurrence of intersexuality, specifically in humans.  
There are numerous forms of human intersexuality;  Table 1 provides a brief 
summary of four of these.   
One of the basic beliefs of the folk understanding is that the concepts MALE 
and FEMALE are logically opposed;  being one precludes the possibility of also 




atomistic: whatever makes a male a male is indivisible, and one cannot be 
more or less male.  (The same relationship is held with respect to being 
female.)  The existence of human intersexuality undermines both of these 
beliefs, and with it, the suggestion that MALE and FEMALE are logically 
opposed.    
 Chromosomal 
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Table 1 Four types of human intersexuality 
This table was created by condensing and combining “Table 10.2: 
Characteristics of Klinefelter‟s Syndrome and Turner‟s Syndrome” (298) and 
“Table 10.3: Ambiguous Sex Characteristics Resulting from Hormone 
Abnormalities” (299) in (Miracle, Miracle and Baumeister 2003).   
 
One might object to this line of argument by saying that intersexuality is so 
rare that it does not reveal anything about the accuracy of essentialist thought 
about sex.   Blackless, et al., (2000) estimate that intersexuality occurs in just 




in mind other congenital abnormalities and their inability to affect our 
concepts of normal human development.  Someone might ask, why think that 
the occurrence of intersexuality suggests that the folk conceptualizations of 
MALE and FEMALE are flawed if one does not also think that a child being born 
without two arms, or without a brain, do not affect our concepts of normal 
human development?  In response to this criticism I would emphasize that 
being born with fewer than two arms, or without a brain, are not conditions 
that combine two normal forms of human development.  Intersexuality, on the 
other hand, is such a state. Human beings are normally born with all-male or 
all-female reproductive parts (something that, to my knowledge, has never 
been at issue).  But the very possibility that a child might be born in a state 
that combines the two does indicate something about the relationship between 
these two normal types.   
The infrequency of intersexuality does matter for a different reason though: 
namely because it helps to maintain the folk understanding of atomism.  Under 
this assumption, sex is indivisible:  one either has all of it all at once, or none 
of it.  Because intersexuality does occur so infrequently, most people have no 
personal experience with it (or are unaware that they have). To put this 
positively, most people have experience with only homogenous collections of 
sex features (individuals with all-male components and individuals with all-
female components).  People base their beliefs, in large part, on the 
experiences that they have, and in regards to sex most people have experience 
only with sets of homogeneous features, i.e., sets of ‗purely‘ male features and 
sets of ‗purely‘ female features.  They conclude from this that maleness and 
femaleness themselves have pure structures.  Intersexuality obviously poses a 
problem for this assumption of the folk understanding.  Intersexuality makes it 
plain that sex is no simple thing, and that its atomist structure is just an illusion 





As this chapter has shown there is good reason to question the accuracy of 
the folk understanding because the belief in the existence of a female or a male 
essence might be just that: a belief.  If the proponents of the folk 
understanding do in fact have more than mere belief, and could actually 
identify those features that are taken to establish the essence, there are still at 
least three good reasons to think that the whole essentialist venture in relation 
to sex (and other things) is flawed.  If the folk understanding is flawed, as I 
have argued that it is, what understanding of sex could be taken up in its 
stead?  The next chapter will examine different versions of the continuum 
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The previous chapter argued that the occurrence of intersexuality 
undermines the assumption that the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ are 
logically opposed.  But does intersexuality illuminate anything else about the 
relationship between these concepts?  In other words, what sense can be made 
of MALE and FEMALE, given intersexuality?  Edward Stein (2001) identifies 
two possibilities.  He writes, ―we might give up the implicit premise that there 
are simply two sexes and say that there are three sexes:  male, female and 
intersex‖ (29).
4
  Alternatively, he suggests that ―we might hold on to the 
picture that there are two sexes by giving up the implicit premise that there is a 
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clear cut line between them‖ (29).  The views of sex discussed in this chapter 
are built upon the second of these options.   
Three different versions of the continuum view will be presented in this 
chapter.  These are what I call: (1) the basic continuum view, (2) the parallel 
continua view,  and (3) the hybrid view.  Like the folk understanding each of 
these three views represents maleness and femaleness as opposites: the key 
difference between these views and the folk understanding is that they take 
these opposites to differ continuously from one another rather than absolutely 
as the folk understanding proposes.   
 
 
5.2  The basic continuum view 
Most of the support for the basic continuum view can be attributed to the 
works of Anne Fausto-Sterling.  In a 1993 paper Fausto-Sterling suggested 
three new sexual categories that would classify the different types of 
intersexuality. In this paper she wrote: 
[T]he standard medical literature uses the term intersex as a 
catch-all for three major subgroups with some mixture of 
male and female characteristics:  the so-called true 
hermaphrodites whom I call herms, who possess one testis 
and one ovary (the sperm- and egg-producing vessels, or 
gonads); the male pseudohermaphrodites (the ―merms‖), 
who have testes and some aspects of the female external 
genitalia but no ovaries; and the female 
pseudohermaphrodites (the ―ferms‖), who have ovaries and 
some aspects of the male external genitalia but lack testes. 
(21) 
This paper is arguably the strongest statement of the basic continuum view of 




her suggestions of these categories she ―had intended to be provocative, but 
had also been writing tongue in cheek‖ (78).  Fausto-Sterling acknowledges 
that this point was lost on many (78 - 79).   
Regardless of the intent behind her suggestion of the new categories 
‗merm,‘ ‗herm,‘ and ‗ferm,‘ Fausto-Sterling was undoubtedly committed to a 
continuum view of sex.  In her 1993 paper, Fausto-Sterling stated ―that sex is a 
vast, infinitely malleable continuum‖ and that ―[b]iologically speaking, there 
are many gradations running from female to male‖ (21).  Fausto-Sterling 
argued the same in later works as well.  In Sexing the Body (2000) she writes: 
[I]f the state and legal system has an interest in maintaining 
only two sexes, our collective biological bodies do not.  
While male and female stand on the extreme ends of a 
biological continuum, there are many other bodies... that 
evidently mix together anatomical components 
conventionally attributed to both males and females. (31) 
In response to the sex-testing that takes place in some professional sports (and 
which assumes, like the folk understanding, that the categories ‗male‘ and 
‗female‘ are logically opposed), Fausto-Sterling (2000) writes: ―A body‘s sex 
is simply too complex.  There is no either/or.  Rather, there are shades of 
difference‖ (3).  Fausto-Sterling‘s co-authored paper ―How Sexually 
Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis‖ (Blackless, et al. 2000) also 
represents and speaks of sex as being on a continuum (162).  In a simple visual 
representation included there, maleness and femaleness are represented as 
ranges along a single continuum;  the space in which they overlap is indicated 
as representing intersexuality (162).  
Other authors support the basic continuum view, but in lesser detail.  Sharon 
Preves (2003), for example, states: ―[D]istinctions between female and male 
bodies are actually on more of a continuum rather than a dichotomy.  The 




matter, are human standards‖ (2 - 3).  She also writes, ―Because sexual 
anatomy occurs on a continuum, diversity and variety are to be expected‖ 
(157).   
Suzanne Kessler (1998) also speaks of a continuum view of sex.  In the 
following passage Kessler discusses continuity in terms of the normal 
occurrence of sexual features:  
We can think about variations in two very different ways.  
The first way is to note that most measurements of a feature 
cluster around the mean, thus creating a norm. The 
conventional medical view of intersexuality is that knowing 
the norms of a feature like phallic size, and knowing that 
most measurements cluster around the mean, validates the 
existence of underlying pathology when norms are not met.  
According to this view, genitals that vary from the norm 
mark a disorder... and treatment involves correcting both the 
deficiency and the marker.  (8) 
Kessler suggests the continuum view as an alternative: ―A second way to think 
about variation is to see it as validating the continuum of the feature, thus 
providing proof that there are arbitrary categories and subjective markers of 
acceptability‖ (8). In these passages Kessler is speaking about variation in 
general, not sexual variation in particular. In terms of biological sex, variation 
simply means that some body parts are bigger in some people and smaller in 
others, some body parts are nonexistent in some people, combined in others, 
and singularly present in others still.   
Intersex activist groups have also supported the basic continuum view.  A 
particularly detailed description of this view appears on the website of The 
Intersex Society of North America (a group that is no longer active).  In a 
section of their website that addresses questions about intersexuality, they 




Intersex is a socially constructed category that reflects real 
biological variation.  To better explain this, we can liken the 
sex spectrum to the colour spectrum.  There‘s no question 
that in nature there are different wavelengths that translate 
into colours most of us see as red, blue, orange, yellow.  But 
the decision to distinguish, say, between orange and red-
orange is made only when we need it... 
In the same way, nature presents us with sex anatomy 
spectrums.  Breasts, penises, clitorises, scrotums, labia, 
gonads – all of these vary in size and shape and 
morphology.  So-called ‗sex‘ chromosomes can vary quite a 
bit, too.  But in human cultures, sex categories get 
simplified into male, female, and sometimes intersex, in 
order to simplify social interactions, express what we know 
and feel, and maintain order. (Intersex Society of North 
America, 2011a) 
The Organisation International des Intersexués (OII) also uses the continuum 
view in their description of their position on healthcare:  ―Our societies have 
accepted a binary construct between male and female which does not reflect 
Nature and the enormous variety of possible sexes which overlap one another 
in various gradations on a spectrum with male at one end and female at the 
other‖ (2011). 
The image included below illustrates the basic continuum view (Figure 5 -1) 
based on Fausto-Sterling‘s (1993, 2000; Blackless, et al. 2000),  Preves‘ 
(2003), Kessler‘s (1998), ISNA‘s (2011) and OII‘s (2011) statements about 
biological sex, and the folk understanding of biological sex that it replaces 






It should be noted here that Leonard Sax (2002) disagrees with Fausto-
Sterling‘s estimate of the frequency of intersex conditions in the human 
population, as well as her description of sex as a continuum.  It is also 
important to note that Sax sees the two as connected.  Using his own, more 
conservative definition of intersexuality, Sax estimates that the frequency of 
intersex is actually 0.018% (177).  Sax makes the contentious statement that 
―Fausto-Sterling‘s argument that human sexuality is a continuum, not a 
dichotomy, rests in large measure on her claim that intersex births are a fairly 
common phenomenon‖ (175).  Sax concludes, ―[t]he available data support the 
conclusion that human sexuality is a dichotomy, not a continuum.  More than 
99.98% of humans are either male or female‖ (177). 
There are two reasons to question Sax‘s conclusion.  The first of these is that 
the existence of fewer people with intersexual conditions does not undermine 
 
5-2 Representation of the folk understanding  
Basic representation of the folk understanding of biological sex according 
to which the concepts MALE and FEMALE are taken to be logically opposed.  
Unlike the continuum view represented in Figure 6-1, this conceptualization 






5-1 The basic continuum view, based on various descriptions 
Representation of the basic continuum view of biological sex.  In this 
conceptualization, MALE and FEMALE form opposite ends of the single 





a continuum representation of sex;  all it does is reduce the ―grey area‖ 
between the two sexes.  And what Sax perhaps fails to notice is that the 
existence of any overlap at all does undermine the existence of a dichotomous 
difference.  Furthermore, it is not clear that Fausto-Sterling‘s continuum view 
depends at all on the frequency, or even the occurrence, of intersexuality.  
Even without intersexuality the categories ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ can still each 
represent a range of configurations which, at one extreme, resemble each 
other.   
 
 
5.3  Sex as a set of parallel continua 
While proponents of the basic continuum view generally speak of sex as 
occurring on a single continuum that has MALE and FEMALE at opposite ends, 
the multiple continua view suggested by John Stoltenberg (1989) emphasizes 
the composite nature of sex, and the fact that its elements can vary 
independently. 
Stoltenberg asks us to imagine ―creatures‖ which ―know that they have been 
born in an infinite variety‖ (25).  These beings ―delight in the fact that they are 
not divisible into distinct categories‖ (26).  Stoltenberg explains that these 
―creatures‖ have awareness of the existence of sexual variation among 
themselves (25 – 26).  Of variety with respect to external genitalia, Stoltenberg 
explains, ―Between their legs are tissue structures that vary along a continuum, 
from clitorises with a vulva through all possible combinations and gradations 
to penises with a scrotal sac‖ (26).  Stoltenberg says that ―[t]hey have sex.  
They do not have a sex‖ (27, emphasis in original).  The point of this thought 




of sex.  Stoltenberg states: ―These creatures, in fact, are us – in every way 
except socially and politically‖ (28).  He writes: 
We are born into a physiological continuum on which there 
is no discrete and definite point that you can call ―male‖ and 
no discrete and definite point that you can call ―female.‖  If 
you look at all the variables in nature that are said to 
determine human ―sex,‖ you can‘t possibly find one that 
will unequivocally split the species into two.  Each of the 
so-called criteria of sexedness is itself a continuum – 
including chromosomal variables, genital and gonadal 
variations, reproductive capacities, endocrinological 
proportions, and any other criterion you could think of.  
Any and all of these different variables may line up in any 
number of ways, and all of the variables may vary 
independently of one another. ( 28) 
Figure 5-3 illustrates the conceptualization Stoltenberg describes.  Each 
element Stoltenberg mentions has been placed on its own continuum, and 
together the set of parallel continua constitutes BIOLOGICAL SEX.  
Using this model of sex, an individual‘s sex would be represented as a set of 
elements that each occur somewhere on the continuum that exists between 
MALE and FEMALE.  The fact that this view allows for independent variation 
offers an important improvement over the basic continuum model, which uses 
just a single continuum to represent a person‘s sex.  A single continuum will 
work for an individual whose features are all male or all female.  The sex of 
an individual with a mixture of features, such as someone with Complete 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (see Table One, Chapter Four) for example, 
would be given a misleading representation if it were represented by a single 
point somewhere between the two extremes.  The parallel continua view that 
Stoltenberg speaks of can address this because it allows for the different 
features to vary independently.   As the next section discusses, however, there 





5.4 The hybrid view 
Comments made by Edward Stein (2001) and Alice Dreger (2004) offer yet 
another variation on the continuum view: what I call ―the hybrid view.‖  Stein 
suggests external genitalia as an example of a feature that can be represented 
upon a continuum, and the Y chromosome (which is associated with fetal 
development of male qualities) as an example of a discontinuous feature (p. 29 
– 30).  Alice Dreger‘s (2004) work One of Us: Conjoined Twins and the 
Future of Normal suggests a similar understanding of SEX.  For example, she 
writes: 
[A]lthough the most widespread notion is that there are only 
two sexes, and although there obviously is one common 
cluster of anatomical variations we categorize as male and 
another we categorize as female, nature doesn‘t tell us 
where to draw the lines.  Nature doesn‘t decide how small a 
penis has to be before a newborn counts as intersexed 
instead of male, and nature doesn‘t decide that testes and a 
Y-chromosome makes an individual a male even though 
androgen insensitivity makes the person look more 
 
5-3 The parallel continua view of sex, based on Stoltenberg‟s (1989) description 
Representation of the Multiple Continua View of Sex, as suggested by 
Stoltenberg (1989).  With this conceptualization, individual components of sex 
are each represented on a continuum individually, allowing for independent 
variation.  The continua themselves place MALE and FEMALE at opposite ends and 




classically womanly than most women.  Search all you want 
for some particular gene, some particular chromosome, 
some particular hormone or brain-cell cluster – the fact is, 
people decide who will be grouped in what sex category, 
because it is important to do so for social reasons.  (150, 
first and second emphases added) 
I take these comments to suggest a view that I call the hybrid view of sex.  I 
have called it this because this view seems to express a combination of the 
folk understanding‘s representation of sex, the basic continuum view, and the 
multiple continua view. Like the basic continuum view, the hybrid view 
allows for quantitative differences between the male and female variations of 
certain sexual elements.  Like the multiple continua view, the hybrid view also 
allows individual features to be represented individually (and thus to vary 
individually).  Unlike either of these views, however, the hybrid view takes 
certain features to be discontinuous.  Because of the discontinuity that exists 
between the different sexual versions of these features, they are represented in 
the same way that the folk understanding takes sex itself to be represented.   
Figure 5-4 presents a representation of this understanding of SEX. 
 
 
5-4 Hybrid view, based on Stein’s (2001) & Dreger’s (2004) descriptions 
Representation of the hybrid view of biological sex, which includes a mixture 
of both dichotomous features and graded features.  Like the multiple 
continua view, this representation allows for sex to have components that 
vary independently from one another.  Unlike both the basic continuum and 
the multiple continua view, this conceptualization allows some of those 
elements to differ qualitatively from one another, while recognizing that 
others will differ quantitatively.  All elements are placed within a space that 












The three views summarized here represent alternatives that have been offered 
as replacements to the folk understanding of sex and its commitments to 
atomism, logical opposition, and group member homogeneity.  If one is 
convinced that essentialist thinking about sex is flawed (as the previous 
chapter argued), then any of the three alternatives just summarized can be 
taken up in its stead.   
As I will try to show in the next chapter, however, these three views are not 
the only alternatives possible. The next chapter will not only present a fourth 
alternative, the multidimensional model of sex, but it will also point out that 














The preceding chapters have attempted to describe the basic beliefs of the folk 
understanding of sex, how they are flawed, and what alternatives have already 
been suggested as its replacement.  In this chapter I will present my suggestion 
for replacement:  a multidimensional view of sex. 
Before presenting the model I will provide discussion of an important  
background idea: the similarities between intersexuality and androgyny, and 
Bem‘s (1974) reconceptualization of the latter.      
 
6.2 Intersexuality and androgyny 
Chapter 4 introduced the topic of intersexuality, a physical state in which an 
individual has both male and female sexual components, or a single sexual 




point negatively, intersexuality occurs when the components of an individual‘s 
sexual system are not homogeneously male nor are they homogeneously 
female. 
There are important and interesting similarities between intersexuality and 
androgyny.  The similarities are so strong that the two concepts are often 
confused and conflated, much in the same way that the concepts SEX and 
GENDER themselves are confused and conflated by the folk understanding.  
Before highlighting the similarities between these two concepts, one must bear 
in mind a key difference between INTERSEXUALITY and ANDROGYNY:  the 
terms intersexual and androgyne do not pick out the same people.  It could 
happen that a person is both intersexual and androgynous, but being 
intersexual does not necessarily or even frequently entail being androgynous, 
nor does being androgynous entail or indicate intersexuality.  To see why this 
is so, it is important to understand that androgyny relates to biological sex in a 
very different way than intersexuality does.   
There are two general types of androgyny.  One of these types has to do 
with appearance.  People who have been called ―androgynous men‖ (such as 
Boy George, David Bowie, and Prince) are individuals whose sex is not in 
question (as ―men‖ here means ―males‖), but whose appearances are not 
strictly ―masculine,‖ by the judgment of society;  similarly, people who have 
been called ―androgynous women‖ (such as Marlene Dietrich, Madonna, and 
k.d. lang)  are thought to be unquestionably female, despite their incorporation 
of ‗masculine‘ elements into their wardrobe and other non-feminine 
adornments.  In these cases, the combination of the person‘s sex (assumed to 
be strictly male or strictly female) and appearance (judged to be more 
masculine than it ought to be for females, or too feminine for males) is the 




The second general type of androgyny has more to do with personality than  
with appearance; as with the first type, however, people can be considered 
androgynous though their sex is thought to be clearly male or female.  In other 
words, one does not need to know if a person is male, female, or some 
combination of the two before being able to say that that person is 
psychologically androgynous. A person‘s psychological state can be 
determined to be androgynous without any knowledge of the structure and 
arrangement of their sexual parts.   
Because androgyny is a mental or behavioural state a person whose sex is 
clearly male or female (by the standards of the folk understanding) can be 
androgynous.  Table 2 (below) summarizes some of these important 















Mind or personality, appearance 
 
 
Combination of both   
„maleness‟ and „femaleness‟ 
(either within the system, or within 
a component of the system) 
 
Combination or expression of 
both   
„masculinity‟ and „femininity‟ 





“Intersex Person” or “Intersexual” “Androgynous Person” or 
“Androgyne” 





The work of social psychologist Sandra Bem (1974) on psychological 
androgyny has inspired the multidimensional model of sex I am presenting in 
this dissertation.  Bem‘s work relates to the second type of androgyny 
mentioned above (psychological androgyny).  Bem‘s paper begins by 
discussing the common understanding of psychological gender that she was 
about to challenge:   
Both in psychology and in society at large, masculinity and 
femininity have long been conceptualized as bipolar ends of 
a single continuum; accordingly, a person has had to be 
either masculine or feminine, but not both. (155) 
Bem points out that since this conceptualization represents ―an inverse 
relationship between masculinity and femininity‖ it cannot recognize 
androgyny as another possibility; androgyny is unintelligible (155).  Bem‘s 
concern with a single continuum representation of psychological gender is that 
it is unable to make sense of androgyny, much as a continuum running from 
cold to hot is unable to represent something‘s being both cold and hot 
simultaneously.  Christopher Kilmartin (2000) represents this understanding in 
Figure 6-1.   
 
Bem sought a way to conceptualize masculinity and femininity that did not 
presume this sort of relationship; the ―Bem Sex Role Inventory‖ (BSRI) is the 
psychological test that corresponds with this reconceptualization.  The BSRI 
uses a set of psychological traits to determine whether a person is 
 














psychologically masculine, feminine, or androgynous.  Bem (1974) explains 
that,    
[t]he Masculinity and Femininity scores of the BSRI are 
logically independent.  That is, the structure of the test does 
not constrain them in any way, and they are free to vary 
independently.  (159)   
What Bem means by this is that the new reconceptualization meant a person 
no longer had to become less feminine in order to become more masculine, or 
less masculine in order to become more feminine.   Masculinity and femininity 
were no longer related to each other in the way that HOT is related to COLD; 
instead, they were related to each more in the way that the concepts HEIGHT 
and WIDTH are related to one another.  A thing can become wider or narrower 
without its height necessarily changing; also, knowing that a thing‘s width has 
changed does not also provide the knowledge that its height has changed as 
well.  The two might happen to be related on some occasions, but they are not 
related by necessity. 
Kilmartin (2000) provides an image to represent the way that Bem 
reconceptualized androgyny, and the relationship between masculinity and 
femininity at work therein (See Figure 6-2).  Bem argued that the relationship 
between a person‘s psychological traits determines that person‘s category:    
the BSRI characterizes a person as masculine, feminine, or 
androgynous as a function of the difference between his or 
her endorsement of masculine and feminine personality 
characteristics.  A person is thus sex typed, whether 
masculine or feminine, to the extent that this difference is 
high, and androgynous, to the extent that this difference is 
low. (156) 
Although Kilmartin‘s image includes the category ‗undifferentiated‘ this was 
not suggested by Bem in her initial writing on psychological androgyny.  




the BSRI; they suggested persons who possess only a few of each type of 
psychological trait be categorized as ―undifferentiated‖ (35).  In a later co-
authored paper, Bem accepted this modification, stating ―the term 
androgynous should henceforth be reserved only for those individuals who 
score high in both masculinity and femininity‖ (Bem, Martyna and Watson 
1976, 1023). More recently Woodhill and Samuels (2004) suggested that the 
categories be further refined to reflect that there is ―desirable androgyny‖ and 
―undesirable androgyny‖ since masculine and feminine traits can themselves 





6-2 "Masculinity and Femininity as Independent Dimensions" from 










The basic conceptual structure that Bem describes and Kilmartin represents 
also suggests a new way to understand biological sex: an understanding that, 
once the structure is modified in certain ways, can represent an individual‘s 
sex as a pattern of components that occur within a space created by the 
intersecting continua MaleC and FemaleC. 
 
 
6.3 A multidimensional model of sex 
6.3.1  Basic structure 
A multidimensional model of sex inspired by Bem‘s reconceptualization of 
psychological androgyny will represent sex as occurring within the space 
created by the intersection of male and female continua (see Figure 6-3), just 
as Bem‘s reconceptualization represented androgyny as being located within 
the space created and divided by masculinity and femininity.  Separating 
maleness from femaleness allows the two to be measured independently, as 
masculinity and femininity were by Bem;  doing so also simultaneously rejects 
the folk understanding‘s assumption of logical opposition.  Changing the 
meaning of the two dimensions also changes the meaning of the quadrants 
they create.  The quadrants created by intersecting male and female continua 
are (1) prototypically female (2) intersexual (3) prototypically male and (4) 
absence, or non-functionality.   
Along with changing the meaning of the continua and the quadrants they 
produce, a major difference between the two models is that Bem‘s 
reconceptualization identifies a person‘s psychological type by a single point 
located somewhere within the space bound by the dimensions of masculinity 
and femininity.  Biological sex, on the other hand, is not simple;  it is not just 




An individual‘s sex will be the complete image created by the representation 
of each component within the model.  Using this model, an individual‘s sex 
can be understood to be multidimensional:  as being the composite of separate 
points represented on the space created by two intersecting continua, one 
which represents the continuity between presence and absence of femaleness, 
and the other which represents the continuity between presence and absence of 
maleness.  No single point is itself the person‘s sex, and each point of the 
composite will simultaneously represent both the presence or absence of 
maleness and the presence or absence of femaleness exhibited by that single 
feature.   
Individual components themselves could be represented by a single point.  
Where this point is located depends upon the characteristics that the particular 
component expresses.  In relation to individual components, the same sort of 
method as that which Bem used in relation to androgyny could be used to 
determine the proper location of the component.  If, however, it turns out that 
a particular component has two different values  (say, if a person has both a 
male gonad and a female gonad), then this single feature could be given 
double representations, in order to indicate that the individual simultaneously 
has both a prototypically male gonad and a prototypically female gonad.  
What is important to note is that along with a double-representation such as 
this, it is also possible to represent a single feature as simultaneously male and 
female (as may be best for the representation of an organ such as an ovotestis, 
described as ―an organ with both ovarian and testicular attributes‖ [Dreger 
1998, 36]).     
All of this being said, in many species, including Homo sapiens, it will 
frequently appear as if an individual‘s sex can be represented by a single point.   





has the same combination of male and female characteristics.  In such cases, 
the multiple points will occur in the same space, and could suggest that the 
individual‘s sex is a single, simple thing, just as the folk understanding 
conceives of it.  Bearing this in mind while trying to use the model will help to 
avoid the conceptual oversimplification of sex, a system of interrelated but 
independently varying components, even when it appears that an individual‘s 
sex is just one thing.  As discussed in Chapter 4, what frequently appears to us 
 
6-3  Basic structure of a multidimensional model of sex 
Representation of the different spaces created by the dimensions MaleC 
and FemaleC.  Where femaleness is highest and maleness lowest (upper left 
quadrant), elements that are prototypically female will be represented.  
Where maleness is highest and femaleness is lowest (lower right quadrant), 
elements that are prototypically male will be represented.  A feature that is 
both highly male and highly female will be represented in the upper right 
quadrant.  If a feature is neither male nor female, or if it is absent, or non-













to be the case, and what we strongly believe to be the case, might actually turn 
out to be otherwise.  
 
6.3.2 What components should be represented? 
Components of an individual‘s sexual system will be represented within the 
space created by the intersection of the two continua MaleC and FemaleC.  
What are the components that are to be given representation?  In this chapter I 
will limit my discussion to a species-specific representation of sex, and so, I 
will focus on those components found in the sexual system of Homo sapiens.  
(The components included in the systems of other species may be different.)  I 
believe that, at a minimum, the representation of a person‘s sex ought to 
include individual representation of external genitalia, gonads, chromosomes, 
and gamete type on the chart.  These components ought to be included because 
they are known to have either male or female features or both, because they 
are known to co-function, and because they are each known to be importantly 
related to reproduction.  Should it turn out that some other feature is found to 
be important, it can also be represented.  
I should note here that I have consciously chosen not to include secondary 
sex characteristics (such as the distribution of body and facial hair, typical 
muscle strength, height, weight, and general body shape) in my discussion of 
the multidimensional model. I have made this choice because such 
characteristics, I believe, are very unlikely to be considered to be determinants 
of a person‘s sex whether sex is understood from the folk understanding, any 





6.3.3   Expected ranges of variation 
Although this model provides a new way to represent sex, it does not reinvent 
sex.  In other words, use of the multidimensional model would not require 
people to change all of their expectations about sex.  Dreger (1998) for 
example, says, ―Certainly we can observe some basic and important patterns 
in the bodies we call ‗male‘ and the bodies we call female‖ (9).  Because there 
is such regularity around us, people can also predict, with a high degree of 
accuracy, what they are likely to see in relation to each of the components just 
suggested. 
Of the four components just suggested, the representation of chromosomes 
and gamete cells will likely display the least amount of variation between the 
prototypical male and female varieties.  The word chromosomes refers to the 
possession of an XX chromosomal pair (categorized as ‗female‘) and an XY 
chromosomal pair (categorized as ‗male‘).  Figure 6-4 represents the areas 
within the model where one can expect a person‘s chromosomes to be 
represented.  XY chromosomal pairs are represented in the lower right 
quadrant, exhibiting a high  degree of maleness, and a low degree of 
femaleness;  XX chromosomal pairs are represented in the upper left quadrant, 
exhibiting a high degree of femaleness, and a low degree of maleness.  
Individuals with Klinefelter‘s Syndrome may have their ―sex‖ chromosomes, 
which are XXY, represented in the upper right quadrant, meaning that they are 
highly intersexual (which is, because of the structure of the model, 
simultaneously saying that they are both highly male and highly female).  
Individuals with Turner‘s Syndrome may have their ―sex‖ chromosomes, 
which are XO, represented at the midpoint of the female continuum, and at the 
lower end of the male continuum;  such placement would indicate that the 




Someone might argue that in cases of intersexuality that involve 
chromosomal variation, such as that which occurs with Klinefelter‘s 
Syndrome and Turner‘s Syndrome, the chromosomes ought to be given a 
double representation.  If this were the case, the chromosomes of someone 
with Klinefelter‘s Syndrome would be represented in both the prototypical 
male and prototypical female quadrants;  the chromosomes of an individual 
with Turner‘s Syndrome would be represented in both the prototypical female 
quadrant and in the quadrant reserved for absent or non-functioning 
components.   
The reason that chromosomes should not be given a dual representation is 
because to do so would overlook the fact that such chromosomes interact.  An 
individual with Klinefelter‘s syndrome does not have both male and female 
chromosomal pairs, but instead has a trio of sex chromosomes; to represent the 
trio as if they were really two pairs would artificially divide them.   
A different concern can be expressed with regards to dual representation of 
the chromosomes of individuals with Turner‘s Syndrome.  If each 
chromosome were given a single representation, then the chromosomal pair 
XO would be represented as prototypically female and absent.  Applying the 
same principle to the representation of the chromosomal pair XY, however, 
would also mean it is identified as both prototypically female (in relation to 
the X) and prototypically male (in relation to the Y).  Because of puzzling 
results like this, I do not think that artificially dividing the chromosomal pair, 
and providing separate representations for each chromosome would be 
functional within this model. The representation of gamete cells will also 
involve minimal variation, but will be more straightforward than chromosomal 






be represented in the prototypically female and prototypically male quadrants, 
respectively.  Should a person produce both sperm and ova, this could be 
represented in both the prototypically female and the prototypically male 
quadrant.  If the person did not produce any gamete cells, this would be 
represented as absence in the lower left quadrant.  These ranges are 
represented in Figure 6-5. 
Much more variation can be expected in the representation of the external 
genitalia and the gonads.  Prototypically female external genitalia, including 
labia minora and majora, clitoris, and vagina, would be given a single 
representation in the upper left quadrant.  Prototypically male external 
genitalia, including a penis and scrotum, would be given a single 
 






representation in the lower right quadrant.  It is highly unlikely, if not 
impossible, that the configuration of an individual‘s external genitalia would 
result in representation in the upper right, intersexual quadrant.  This 
unlikelihood is due to the fact that a continuum does exist between the typical 
female variation and the typical male variation of external genitalia; in just the 
case of the external genitalia (though not in relation to other components under 
consideration), it makes sense to infer that the more male external genitalia are 
the less female they are, and vice versa.  This continuum exists because female 
and male external genitalia began in utero as the same thing (see Figure 6-6), 
and more regularly than other sexual components, do not completely 











6-6 “Stages in the Development of the External Sexual Organs in the Male and 
the Female" (Gray [1918]  2000). 
Drawings from Henry Gray‟s ([1918] 2000) Anatomy of the Human Body 
illustrating the differentiation, in utero, of common tissue into either male or 

















Given the common origin of the female and male external genitalia the 
range of variation expected for this feature will extend from one extreme end 
of prototypicality to the other, in addition to the range that represents absence 
and nonfunctionality (see Figure 6-7).  Should an individual‘s genitalia vary 
from the two most typical configurations, they almost certainly will exhibit a 
mid-state somewhere between the two rather than a combination of the 
prototypical varieties of the two. 
The fourth component, gonadal type, can be expected to exhibit the most 
variation out of the set (though variation of this component will likely occur 
less frequently than in others).  The prototypical male and female gonads, 
testes and ovaries, would be given representation in their respective quadrants.  
 






If an individual has a single ovotestis, this would be given representation in 
the upper right hand corner, as that gonad would be both highly male and 
highly female. Should an individual have a poorly functioning, 
underdeveloped gonad of any type, this will be indicated somewhere in the 
lower left quadrant;  where exactly will depend upon the relative male and 
female qualities of the gonad.  If the individual has no gonads whatsoever, this 
will be represented in the lowest and leftmost point in the lower left quadrant 
(see Figure 6-8).   
In cases where an individual has both an ovary and a testicle, the same 
question arises as to whether or not the gonads should be treated as a single 
entity and given a single representation, or as separate components each with 
its own representation.  When this question arose before, I argued that 
chromosomal pairs should be given a single representation;  with regards to 
gonads, however, it seems to make the most sense to provide a single 
representation when the items of the pair ‗match‘ (i.e., are both female, both 
male, or both are ovostestes), and a double representation when they do not.  
The reason for this difference is found in the relationship between the items of 
the chromosomal pairs, and the relationship between the items of the gonadal 
pair (if there is such a pair) when these occur in their prototypically male and 
female forms.  The difference that makes the difference is this:  in their 
prototypical occurrences gonadal types will match, but the same is not true of 
prototypical chromosomal pairs.  With chromosomal pairs, the quality of 
‗matching‘ is characteristic of the female type, while being mismatched 






This section of the chapter will discuss three examples in order to show how 
the outlines discussed above might be applied to actual individuals.  Before 
considering examples of non-ordinary sex, it will help to reconsider the 
prototypical male and the prototypical female representations (see Figure 6-9).  
These representations show how the alignment of components can give the 
impression of atomism:  the fact that the chromosomes, gametes, external 
genitalia and gonads of each individual‘s sex neatly group together in these 
representations obscures the fact that they are actually separate components. It 
is when these components occupy different spaces in the model, when the 
 





prototypical versions of sex disintegrate, that the necessity and advantages of a 
multidimensional model are revealed. 
 
6-9 Prototypical male and prototypical female sex represented on the 
multidimensional model 
 
The first example (Figure 6-10) represents the sex of an individual who has 
a condition called ―Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome‖ or ―PAIS.‖  
Dreger (1998) describes the mechanism behind this syndrome as follows: 
In AIS [Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome], the testes 
produce the usual androgens effective in male development.   
The body lacks a key androgen receptor, however, and so 
the body cannot ―hear‖ or ―read‖ the androgen 
(―masculinizing‖) messages.  Therefore, rather than 
developing along the typical masculine developmental 
pathway, the tissues develop along more ―feminine lines.‖ 




With Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome individuals ―can have 
normal female sex characteristics, both male and female sex characteristics, or 
normal male characteristics‖ (U.S. National Library of Medicine 2008).  The 
representation displayed in Figure 6-10 would be accurate for an individual 
who has XY chromosomes, testicles that do not produce gametes and a mild 
form of what is sometimes called ―feminized‖ genitalia;  this individual‘s 
penis may be small, the scrotum may not be completely fused, and the urethra 
may be somewhere other than at the end of the penis.  If the individual had 
more severe ―feminization,‖ (say, if the scrotum were only very slightly fused, 
and the penis were very small) then a representation closer to the prototypical 
female representation (and simultaneously further away from the prototypical 
male representation) may be more appropriate.  It should be noted that at  
some point it becomes unclear whether what is being described is ―feminized‖ 
male genitalia, or ―masculinised‖ female genitalia, a so-called ―micropenis‖ or 
a case of ―cliteromegaly.‖  Fausto-Sterling discusses this in Sexing the Body 
(2000, 56 – 62) and the Intersex Society of North America (2011b), for 
example, states in a their description of Partial Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome that ―the clitoris is large or, alternatively, the penis is small.‖  
When the level of insensitivity involved in AIS is said to be ―complete‖ 
affected individuals will ―have the external sex characteristics of females, but 
do not have a uterus and therefore do not menstruate and are unable to 
conceive a child‖ (U.S. National Library of Medicine 2008).  Dreger (1998) 
explains that individuals with this form of AIS ―seem to fit the dominant 
feminine ideal in the United States today better than most medically ‗true‘ 
females‖ (38).  Figure 6-11 represents the sex of an individual who is affected 
by this form of AIS.  As with the previous example, chromosomal pair and 





Again it is assumed that the testes do not produce sperm, and so gametic sex is 
represented in the lower left quadrant.  This individual‘s genitalia would be 
prototypically female, and represented in the corresponding quadrant, since 
this individual has complete androgen insensitivity syndrome. 
The final example to be discussed in this section is the representation of sex 
given for an individual who has ―feminized‖ male genitalia (i.e., genitalia that 
resemble the prototypical male version more than the prototypical female 
 
6-10 Example 1 - Individual with partial androgen insensitivity syndrome 
This individual has both testes and an XY chromosomal pair, which have 
been located in the lower right quadrant.  Because this hypothetical 
individual has ambiguous external genitalia that exhibit some female and 
some male qualities, this is located still in the lower right quadrant 
(assuming that the genitalia are, overall, more male than female), but 
closer to the intersexual and prototypically female quadrant.  Since this 
individual does not produce gamete cells, gametic sex is located at the 











version, but are, taken together, not prototypically male), an ovotestis that 
produces both sperm and ova, and the prototypically male XY chromosomal 
pair  (see Figure 6-12).  Two things set this example apart from the previous 
two, as well as from the ordinary male and female groupings.  This 
individual‘s gonadal sex is represented by a single point in the intersexual 
quadrant;  having only one gonad, and this gonad being itself a both male and 
female, it is properly represented in the upper right hand quadrant.  Since it is 
assumed in this case that this gonad produces both types of gametes, these are 
represented by separate points in the two prototypical quadrants; there is no 
 
 
6-11 Example 2 - Individual with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome 
The sex of this individual is identical to the sex of the individual represented in 
figure 6-10 except for the representation of external genitalia.  This 
individual‟s external genitalia are represented at the furthest point of the top 





















single gamete that is somehow both egg and sperm so as to justify giving the 







6-12 Example 3 - Individual with functioning ovotestis and feminized male 
genitalia 
Because this hypothetical individual has a functioning ovotestis, gametic sex 
will require double representation.  Gonadal sex, because in this case it refers 
to a single organ (rather than an ovary and a single teste) would require a 
single representation at the further point of the intersexual (top right) 
quadrant.  If this individual had had an ovary and a testicle (instead of an 
ovotestis), then this could have been represented the same way as gametic 
















6.5 Discussion of the model 
 
6.5.1   Parts, not people 
According to the folk understanding, sex is a whole-person category; the 
word female is applied to people at the same level as words like parent or 
scientist or artist.  Discussing sex as if it were a whole-person category 
presumes that there is such a thing as ―a female‖ and ―a male.‖  Such an 
understanding, I think, is based upon the flawed beliefs in atomism and logical 
opposition:  people are thought to be one or the other, and whichever one they 
are, they are that type completely. 
The multidimensional model of sex I have just described does not presume 
that the words male and female have meaning beyond the individual 
components that they describe.  In other words, there is no sexual type that is 
greater than the individual parts.  If an individual has components that are all 
accurately described as prototypically female (i.e., ovaries, external female 
genitalia, XX chromosomal pair, and ova) then that is the total of the person‘s 
sex:  the components of the set do not create some higher-level meaning once 
they are grouped together. 
The prevalence of the folk understanding, as well as the fact that there is 
generally a one-to-one correspondence between consciousness and human 
bodies, likely work together to create the impression that there is a property 
that emerges from the combination of the parts themselves.  We, as human 
beings, experience the world from inside one body, and in almost all cases, 
that body will have sexual components that are homogenously male or female.   
So, the question remains:  can the multidimensional understanding of sex 
described above make sense of statements like ―Sue is a female‖ or ―Bob is a 




concepts MALE and FEMALE apply to individual features; the fact that most 
people have parts that can be similarly described does not justify the further 
conclusion that there is some type of which that person, as a whole, is.  There 
is, I believe, no sex that is more than the sum of its parts:  there are just the 
individual parts that are themselves best described as ―male,‖ ―female,‖ or 
―both‖ (i.e., intersexual). 
 
6.5.2 Interspecific use   
Not only people have biological sex, of course.  Sex, maleness, and 
femaleness all exist in non-human forms in non-human individuals.  Could the 
non-human forms of sex be effectively spoken of using the multidimensional 
model?  Can someone who is speaking about non-human biological sex 
successfully use a model that suggests maleness and femaleness be spoken of 
at the level of parts or features, but not at the level of the individual? 
I think that the multidimensional model, if widely adopted, would be 
capable of effectively and successfully representing the biological sex of any 
species that reproduces sexually.  To demonstrate why I think this is the case,  
two topics need to be considered:  1) what reasons there are to think that the 
multidimensional model can be used beyond human versions of biological sex, 
and 2) how it might actually be used to do so. 
There are at least two reasons to think that an understanding of sex that 
speaks of maleness and femaleness at the level of parts rather than at the level 
of individuals could be used effectively in biology.  The first of these reasons 
stems from the definitions of male, female, and hermaphrodite.  In Chapter 4 
definitions of these terms were provided which identified sex by the type of 
gametes produced by an individual‘s reproductive organs (Martin and Hine, 




discussion is not on a single species, sex is already spoken of in biology at the 
level of individual features (i.e. the type of cell produced) not at the level of 
the individual (i.e. the individual that produces those cells).  Secondly, when 
biologists do speak of a single individual as being ―a male‖ or ―a female‖ or ―a 
hermaphrodite‖ they are using these terms with a species-specific meaning in 
mind. To clarify this statement, consider the following discussion of sex 
categories: 
Typically we refer to males and females as different sexes.  
There are many differences between the sexes, for example, 
in size, colouration, sexual organs, and parental care.  Yet 
none of these are consistent differences across the range of 
animal and plant species.  The only consistent difference 
between the two sexes is size of the gametes: males produce 
small gametes (sperm or pollen), whereas females produce 
large gametes (ova or more technically oocytes) (Hurst 
2003).  
What this definition suggests is that whatever is being claimed beyond gamete 
type about ―a male‖ or ―a female‖ is going to be a statement about the 
particular species under consideration, and not about sex as it exists 
independent of that species; this is to say that when a biologist speaks about ―a 
male‖ or  ―a female‖ of a species, they are also speaking about ―a male‖ or ―a 
female‖ for that species.  Since the conceptualizations already being used in 
biology categorize sex based on the possession of certain parts by that 
individual (i.e. parts that produce sperm or ova at a minimum), and since any 
further statements about maleness and femaleness are going to be species-
specific, it is likely that biologists could use the multidimensional model 
without any great adjustments to theory or practice.  
How would the model be used if biologists were to use it?  Its exact use 
would have to be determined by those familiar with the species being 




species. For example, what would count as ―normal‖ external genitalia for a 
particular species would have to be determined by those who study that 
species.  Consider, for example, the following description of the female 
external genitalia of certain non-human primates that,   
have an exaggerated clitoris that can be as long as or even 
longer than the penis, and, in these cases, is pendulous like 
a penis.  The clitoris is, just like the penis, perforated by the 
urethra in the centre… The clitoris is especially similar to 
the male penis in Varecia Variegata and Galago 
Crassicaudatus.  The similarity of the clitoris and the penis 
makes a visual sex determination at a distance almost 
impossible. (Ankel-Simons 2007, 523)    
Clearly what is prototypically female for these primates is not what is 
prototypically female for human primates.  The multidimensional model could 
represent this, as those familiar with the particular species under consideration 
would be the ones to judge what is prototypically male or female for that 
particular species. 
Those familiar with other species might use the model to show that there is 
no prototypically female or prototypically male groups of features in that 
species.  Consider, for example, Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), a worm 
species in which there is no individual with only female features (Herman 
2005).  In addition to individuals with only male features, C. elegans also has 
hermaphroditic individuals, described as, 
a modified female that in the fourth larval stage makes and 
stores sperm to be used later to fertilize oocytes produced 
within the gonad of the same animal after spermatogenesis 
is finished.  (Herman 2005) 
Were biologists to use the multidimensional model to represent the sex of 




prototypically female quadrant, but no single individual’s sex would be 
completely represented there. 
For other species chromosomal sex might be of very little importance, or of 
different importance than it is in the representation of human sex. The Y 
chromosome in Drosophila, for example, is not involved with ‗maleness‘ in 
the same way that it is in human beings, since in that species ―it is not 
involved in determining sex‖ (Gilbert 2000). As another example, one can 
consider C. elegans again, which has two chromosomal sexes: XX (in the case 
of the hermaphroditic, or ―modified female‖ individuals) and XO (in the case 
of individual with only male sexual features) (Zarkower 2006). For use with 
any particular species the model would have to be tailored to reflect what sex 
is like for the species being represented; and our knowledge about what sex is 
like for that species could change as well. For example, one can consider an 
article by McLachlan and Storey (2003), who suggest that sperm in mammals 
(which will determine the chromosomal sex of offspring) might be susceptible 
to temperature effects; this sensitivity, if it does exist, could shed light on what 
they call the ―distinctly odd‖ reality that male gonads in human beings (and 
other animals) are normally located outside the body, unlike any other organ 
(71-72). If it could be shown that McLachlan and Storey are right, then 
perhaps the multidimensional model‘s representation of human sex would 
have to be adapted in order to show that the chromosomal pairs are not, by 
themselves, prototypically male or female.   
So although the suggestion that sex be spoken of at the level of parts rather 
than at the level of the individual might seem uncomfortable, especially to 
biologists, it needs to be recognized that this is much like the way they speak 
about these things already.  To call an individual of a particular species ―a 
male‖ or ―a female‖ is really just a shorthand way to say that the individual 




sperm or ova, respectively.  The multidimensional model‘s further suggestion 
that this underlying meaning be made explicit would, I would think, be a 
reasonable request. 
  
6.5.3 The multidimensional model maintains maleness and 
femaleness 
Someone might ask why the two continua that form the foundation of the 
multidimensional model are still named ―male‖ and ―female,‖ if they do not 
mean male and female in the way that the folk understanding understands 
them.  The concern might be described as follows:  if the folk understanding is 
mistaken, and it takes male and female to be the only two possible categories 
of sex, why use the words male and female to refer to the basic structures of 
the multidimensional model?  Would it not be better to adopt a new name that 
is not weighed down by these connections with the folk understanding?   
This sort of concern is much like one that feminist philosophers who were 
arguing in favour of androgyny faced.  Speaking about this possible criticism 
of ANDROGYNY Mary-Anne Warren (1982) wrote:  
It might be argued that the concept of psychological 
androgyny is self-defeating; while it suggests the 
elimination of the sexual stereotyping of human character, it 
is in itself formulated in terms of the very concepts of 
―femininity‖ and ―masculinity‖ which it urges us to 
abandon. Is it not at least mildly paradoxical to urge people 
to cultivate both ―feminine‖ and ―masculine‖ virtues while 
at the same time holding that virtues ought not be sexually 
stereotyped? …To go on calling these traits ―masculine,‖ 
even in the process of urging women to develop them, 
seems to risk encouraging the assumption that it is, after all, 
easier and more natural for men to do so. (181) 
One could frame a question about the multidimensional model in much the 




people to reconceptualize SEX but the reconceptualization itself makes use of 
the same concepts (i.e. MALE and FEMALE) that are fundamental to the 
understanding that the multidimensional model seeks to replace. 
To respond to this objection it is important to emphasize that the 
reconceptualization I have suggested revises the categories ‗male‘ and 
‗female‘ but it does not eliminate them, and it does not intend to eliminate 
them;  in fact, the concepts MALE and FEMALE are necessary to the 
multidimensional model itself, and it could not exist without them.  It is 
important to bear in mind that the words male and female continue to have 
meaning in a mental scheme that makes use of the multidimensional model of 
sex: the important difference, however, is that these meanings are different 
from those that are given to them by the folk understanding.  The 
multidimensional model, actually, could make no more sense of SEX without 
MALE and FEMALE than the folk understanding could.  
It is possible that someone might have an even more complex concern about 
the names of the continua that underpin the multidimensional model.  
Someone might reason that if (1) maleness and femaleness constitute the 
foundation of the multidimensional understanding of sex, and if (2) individual 
parts are to be represented within the space created by the intersection of 
MaleC and FemaleC, and (3) there is no maleness or femaleness beyond the 
parts themselves, why are these continua still called maleness and femaleness?  
In other words, what makes the groups [XY chromosomes, male external 
genitalia, testes, and sperm] and [XX chromosomes, female external genitalia, 
ovaries, and ova] internally coherent?  How does being closely located within 
the some space created by the intersecting continua make these groups of male 
features or of female features?  How is an XY chromosomal pair like a penis, 
such that they are both accurately categorized as ‗male‘?  And, how is an 




This more complex concern is much more difficult to address.  I can, 
however, suggest one way to address it.  This concern can be addressed, I 
believe, by knowledge about the species whose sexual features are being 
represented by the model at the time that the concern is raised.  To see how 
this happens, consider again the two particular groups of features just 
considered.  The coherence of these groups stems from two things: 1) their 
being groups of human features, and 2) the fact that in human beings these 
groups of features form a prototypically male grouping or a prototypically 
female grouping.  In other words, an XY chromosomal pair and a penis, and 
an ovary and a vulva are alike (respectively) in the sense that the features in 
each pair typically go together in the formation of the prototypical male and 
prototypical female groupings in the species Homo sapiens (respectively). In 
keeping with the definitions already discussed, which grouping is male and 
which is female will be determined by which produces sperm and which 
produce ova, respectively. If it were the sex of individuals of another species 
under consideration the full groups [XY chromosomes, male external 
genitalia, testes, and sperm] and [XX chromosomes, female external genitalia, 
ovaries, and ova] very well might not be coherent.  The meaning of maleness 
and femaleness and the coherence of the groups of features identified as 
belonging to each will likely have to be determined on a species-by-species 
basis.  
 
6.5.4   Representing changes 
In her work Sexing the Body Fausto-Sterling (2000) discusses the various 
ways in which a person‘s sex can change in the span of a lifetime.  She says, 
―We take for granted that the bodies of a newborn, a twenty-year-old, and an 
eighty-year-old differ.  Yet we persist in a static vision of anatomical sex‖ 




and exercise‖ as well as ―disease, accident, or surgery‖ can all change a 
person‘s sex from what it was at an earlier point in time (242). 
One advantage that a multidimensional model of sex has over the folk 
understanding is that it is able to represent a person‘s sex as non-static. 
According to the folk understanding, a person is either male or female, and 
that is the end of the story.  With this understanding, the only change that is 
possible to represent is absolute change: ceasing to be a member of one sex 
and simultaneously becoming a member of the ‗opposite‘ sex.  Although this 
change is possible to conceptualize using the logic of the folk understanding, it 
is unlikely that a person who holds this understanding will think that such a 
change is actually possible:  the folk understanding has little imagination, and 
is highly inflexible.  
Continuum understandings could represent change as well, but the new and 
old representations would continue to suffer from the same problems as any 
other representation using a continuum understanding:  it either reduces sex to 
a single representation (as the basic continuum view does), or it artificially 
divides sexual features in order to represent simultaneous maleness and 
femaleness (as all continuum views would be forced to do).  And it would also 
continue (as discussed above) to endorse the view that the relationship 
between MALE and FEMALE is like the relationship between the concepts HOT 
and COLD, rather than as being like the relationship between the concepts 
WIDTH and HEIGHT.     
The belief in the stability of sex that Fausto-Sterling identifies could be 
attributed to the also mistaken belief that there is some sex-type that exists 
beyond or above the sexual components themselves;  if one thought that such 
a thing did exist, then it seems likely one would also think that such a thing 




there is a meaning to sex that is beyond the components of sex, we can 
appreciate that an individual‘s sex, the components of their sexual system and 
their relative maleness and femaleness, may go through a series of changes in 
the time between birth and death.   
A few examples will illustrate how these changes could be represented by 
the multidimensional model of sex.  Figure 6-13 represents the sex of an 
individual who, at the age of 75, has prototypically female external genitalia as 
well as prototypically female chromosomes.  In this example, the person has 
undergone a complete hysterectomy at some point in the past, and thus 
gametic and gonadal sex are represented in the lower left quadrant.  Also in 
Figure 6-13 is the representation of the sex of this same individual, but at 
some earlier point in time.  In this representation, all sexual components are 
present and prototypically female, and are thus represented in the upper left 
hand corner of the grid.    
Fausto-Sterling also mentions change in sex that is undergone by ―surgical 
transsexuals‖ (p. 242).  The multidimensional model could give these 
occurrences representation:  Figure 6-14 suggests a way to represent the sex of 
an individual who has undergone sex reassignment surgery.   
Cases of sex reassignment surgery raise interesting and important questions 
to do with authenticity, as do the surgical treatments performed on children 
with intersexual conditions.  (The moral implications of the multidimensional 
model on the latter type will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.)  Even if 
the multidimensional model could adequately represent surgical sexual 
change, which I believe it can, questions of authenticity would likely become a 
debate.  Should a surgically fabricated penis be given the same representation 
as a naturally occurring penis?  Should more prototypically female genitalia be 




if the former is surgically created and the latter is naturally occurring?  
Questions such as these are rich and interesting, but are also beyond the scope 
of this current project.  In brief response I can say that the answers to these 
questions will likely depend upon the connection that one assumes to exist 
between the natural, spontaneous occurrence of a sexual feature and that 
feature‘s prototypicality.  Someone whose notions of prototypical maleness 
and prototypical femaleness involve the presupposition that these naturally 
occur will not be satisfied with a representation that does not somehow 
disambiguate naturally occurring and surgically formed features.  On the other 
hand, someone whose understanding of prototypicality does not presume any 
connection to naturalness would not require such disambiguation between 
surgically created and naturally occurring features (though they could require 
it for some other reason).  This connection would need to be revisited before 
the multidimensional model could be used in a clinical setting. 
The examples of ―disease, accident, and surgery‖ (Fausto-Sterling, 242) just 
discussed use different charts to represent different times;  it should be noted, 
in conclusion, that a single chart could be used to represent change over an 
individual‘s life.  The chart could then become a timeline of sorts, identifying 
such things as menopause, surgical removal, and transplants.   
 
 
6.6   Conclusion 
Chapter 1 mentioned the fear that some people might have about abandoning 
the folk understanding of sex and adopting something in its stead.  
Specifically, people might fear that in giving up the folk understanding and its 
basic beliefs, they must also give up their understanding of themselves.  The 




multidimensional model, and it is still something to which the descriptors male 
and female apply.  It is not, however, a whole-person category.  As the next 
chapter demonstrates, however, there are good reasons to think that life might 
be better if people were not understood as being females or males, but rather 






       
 
6-13 Example 4 – Individual at younger and older age 
Both of these representations relate to a single individual, but at different 
points in time.  In this example 50 years separate the two representations.  The 
upper representation depicts the individual at the age of 25, at which point all 
components are prototypically female;  the lower representation depicts the 
same individual later in life.  Because of a hysterectomy, this individual‟s 









6-14 Example 5 – Sex Reassignment Surgery 
These representations depict the sex of an individual before (upper 
representation) and after (lower representation) undergoing sex reassignment 
surgery.   This example assumes that surgically created genitals would be 















7.1  Introduction 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I acknowledged the propensity people 
have toward rejecting any reconceptualization of sex.  One of my responses to 
this resistance was to highlight that reconceptualizing sex does not mean 
rejecting sex as something that is conceptually important, or as something that 
exists in the world.  Sex undeniably exists; the reconceptualization I have 
offered simply illustrates that it exists in a different way than what most 
people think.   
I realize that asking people to critically examine their own understanding of 
SEX is asking more than a little.  The concepts MALE and FEMALE are very 
important, as we use them to make sense of everyday experiences.  It is a 




female.  In addition to this importance, the most common understanding of sex 
(i.e., the folk understanding) seems obviously accurate; every day of our lives 
we encounter example after example of apparent evidence in favour of it.  
Anyone who chooses to critically examine this understanding of sex is 
undertaking a labour intensive endeavour.  So, why do it?  Why take on the 
work associated with reconceptualizing sex?  I can suggest two reasons.   
First, the work associated with the reconceptualization of sex should be 
taken on because sex unquestionably exists in the ―real world,‖ the world in 
which people live, love, and have to pay the bills.  No matter one‘s view on 
the details of the relationship between MALE and FEMALE, I think everyone can 
agree that in modern Western society (and other societies as well), the 
combination of (1) one‘s biological sex and (2) the dominant understanding of 
sex within one‘s culture affects numerous aspects of an individual‘s life.   
Secondly, people ought to take on the work of reconceptualization because 
the concepts MALE and FEMALE are closely tied to ideas about right and wrong: 
in other words, many common ideas about morality are importantly tied up 
with ideas about males, females, men, women, girls and boys, and the 
differences between them. 
In this concluding chapter I will identify some of the practices in Western 
society that exhibit the juncture between sex and morality, and I will suggest 
the ways in which adoption of the multidimensional conception of sex would 
affect how these practices would be perceived.  I will present the general 
argument that widespread social acceptance of the fact that maleness and 
femaleness are qualities that occur at the level of parts, not at the level of 
people (a commitment inherent to the multidimensional model), would be 
likely to produce dramatic changes in the reasoning and actions associated 




everyday life, these changes in thought would likely change how we think 
about each other, and how we think we ought to live our lives.    
 
7.2     Medical moral issues 
Changing one‘s understanding of sex involves changing one‘s understanding 
of diseases and medical processes related to sex.  In the examples discussed 
below I will try to show that changing one‘s conceptual basis also reveals 
moral concerns about these diseases and processes.   
 
7.2.1   Intersexuality 
Under the folk understanding, a person with an intersex condition is simply 
illogical, given the meanings this understanding attributes to males and 
females.  Intersexuality is as puzzling as other combinations of contradictory 
concepts:  under the folk understanding, the notion of a male female, or female 
male (the first word in each pair being used as an adjective, and the second in 
each pair being used as a noun) makes about as much sense as the notions of  
immoral justice or static motion.  As just discussed, the common reaction to 
intersexuality is to dismiss the importance of the occurrence, not the 
conceptualization of sex it contradicts.  Considering these other contradictory 
combinations, it is easy to see why people react in this way.  Most people 
encountering instances of these contradictions (i.e., something that is moving 
in a static way) would likely conclude that there is something not right with 
either the situation or their perception of it.  Very few people, I think, would 
think that there is something wrong with the concepts involved.  Widespread 
adoption of the multidimensional understanding, on the other hand, would 
require people to reconsider their concepts.  As the following discussions will 




the multidimensional understanding would likely lead to substantial change in 
the medical treatment currently given to individuals with intersex conditions 
and their families.       
 
7.2.1.1 Should intersex conditions be considered disorders? 
In 2006, two professional associations of endocrinologists (the Lawson 
Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society and the European Society for Pediatric 
Endocrinology) published their ―Consensus Statement on Management of 
Intersex Disorders‖ (Hughes et. al. 2006).  In this publication, the groups 
suggest using the name ―Disorders of Sex Development‖ in place of older 
terms including ―intersexuality‖ (554).  Table 3 (below) is reproduced from 
this consensus statement, and summarizes the specific changes it suggests.   
The inclusion of the word ―consensus‖ in the title of the document might 
have been misleading: actually, there were a number of reactions.  Within the 
intersex community there was both guarded acceptance and outright rejection.  
The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), some members of which were 
involved with the development of the new name, officially supported the name 
change, as well as other aspects of the Consensus Statement.  Specifically, 
ISNA identifies the statement‘s ―[p]rogress in patient-centered care,‖ its ―more 
cautious approach to surgery‖ and ―getting rid of misleading language‖ as 
benefits (Intersex Society of North America 2011c).  Regarding the third of 
these benefits, they state, ―By getting rid of a nomenclature based on 
‗hermaphroditism,‘ our hope is that this shift will help clinicians move away 
from the almost exclusive focus on gender and genitals to the real medical 
problems people with DSD face‖ (Intersex Society of North America 2011c). 
The Organisation Internationale des Intersexués (OII) responded differently.  




―pathological definitions of our bodies and our identities‖ as well as the 
suggestion itself that an agreement was ever reached about this issue 











Undervirilisation of an XY male 
Undermasculinisation of an XY male 
 
46, XY DSD 
Female pseudohermaphrodite 
Overvirilisation of an XX female 
Masculinsation of an XX female 
 




XX male or XX sex reversal 
 
46, XX testicular DSD 
XY sex reversal 
 
46, XY complete gonadal 
dysgenesis 
Table 3 “Proposed Revised Nomenclature” reproduced from “Consensus                             
Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders” (Hughes et. al., 2006, 
155). 
 
There was a range of responses from academics as well.  Elizabeth Reis 
(2007) suggested the name ―Divergence of Sex Development‖ instead of 
―Disorders of Sex Development.‖  She states that ―[u]sing divergence, intersex 
people would not be labeled as being in a physical state absolutely in need of 
repair‖ (541).  Milton Diamond  argued that the word ―difference‖ (2009) or 
―variation‖ (Diamond and Beh 2006) be used instead of the word ―disorder.‖ 
Ellen K. Feder and Katrina Karkazis (2008b) argue that the suggestions that 
―variety‖ or ―divergence‖ be used instead of the word ―disorder‖ are well-




nomenclature brings with it the possibility of focusing on genuine medical 
needs while – and this must be the ongoing challenge – understanding 
different anatomies that are symptomatic of these conditions as mere 
variations‖ (35, emphasis added).  In another  paper Feder and Karkazis 
(2008a) are still optimistic, but speak of the new name as provisional, rather 
than permanent. Again they state that the new name can ―refocus our attention 
away from interventions aimed at providing a coherent gender to those that 
improve health and wellbeing‖ (2017).  They also state, however, that ―it is 
[their] hope that as these [intersex] conditions come to be treated as disorders 
like many others, the individual diagnoses will be regarded alongside 
conditions that genuinely share clinical features‖ (372).  Feder  (2009) states 
elsewhere that the new name ―may thus promote the transformation of the 
conceptualization of intersex conditions from ‗disorders like no other‘ to 
‗disorders like many others‘‖ (136), phrases that Karkazis and Feder also use 
in their earlier paper, (2008b, 35). 
In my writing I have consciously chosen to continue to use the word intersex 
rather than adopt the term disorders of sex development.  There are two 
reasons that make me think that popular adoption of the multidimensional 
model of sex would lead others to do the same.   
First, using the name disorder of sex development to describe intersexuality 
seems rooted in the folk understanding, although this has more to do with the 
way that the word disorder works than with the folk understanding itself.  To 
say that something is disordered is to say that its current state is not what it 
would be if it were ordered.  Absence of a thing makes sense only when we 
can imagine the thing being present.  It makes little to no sense, for example, 
to claim that water molecules in a glass or ash particles in a campfire are 
disordered.  These statements would make no sense because we do not have a 




of disorder only in those cases where we can imagine order; we will recognize 
something as disordered only when we have the expectation that it will be 
ordered.   
In relation to intersexuality, these revelations mean that recognition of 
disorders of sex development are possible only if what it would be for sex 
development to be ordered can be imagined, and is expected.  If this is the 
case then I can imagine that most people can have no other ―order‖ in mind 
than that represented by the folk-concepts of MALE and FEMALE.  The folk 
categories represent the order against which intersex conditions are judged to 
be disordered.   The folk understanding of sex, therefore, seems to play an 
important role in the characterization of intersex conditions as ―disorders of 
sex development,‖ even if this is not the intention of those who suggest and 
support the use of this name.  Further evidence for this conclusion is that the 
term disorder seems to be applied only in those cases where maleness and 
femaleness are somehow mixed; I have not encountered any arguments 
suggesting that such things as possession of two uteri, two vaginas, two 
penises, ―tubular‖ breasts, or inverted nipples ought to also be considered 
symptomatic of ―disorders of sex development‖ although they must 
presumably be considered examples of disordered sex development if 
anything is.  This leads me to the conclusion that the name ―disorders of sex 
development‖ is reserved specifically for those conditions that affect sex in 
such a way that maleness and femaleness are mixed (which is, of course, a 
logical impossibility for the folk understanding). 
The second reason I have not adopted the use of the name ―disorders of sex 
development‖ is because its recommendation comes with expectations about 
use that are, in all likelihood, too high.  Feder and Karkazis (2008b) write 
―[t]he new nomenclature brings with it the possibility of focusing on genuine 




different anatomies that are symptomatic of these conditions as mere 
variations‖ (35, emphasis added).  The expectation seems to be that people 
adopt and use the word disorder to refer to intersexuality, but resist thinking of 
the end-state of the disorder (i.e., the individual‘s sex) as being disordered 
itself.  In a society dominated by the folk understanding, this seems too much 
to ask.  Curiously, even Karkazis (2008) herself seems to express doubt about 
this possibility in her work Fixing Sex; in this work she writes, ―[a]lthough 
some may be able to rethink the meaning of genital variability and the 
profound entanglements between genitals and gender, most clinicians and 
parents are either unprepared or unable to do this‖ (259).  In addition to being 
weighed down by the folk understanding, most people will not be used to 
using the word disorder in the way suggested.  For most people a name such 
as ―Disorder of X‖ indicates that in people who have that disorder, X is 
disordered.  And to say that X is disordered is to say it is not as it ought to be.  
The strange feature of Feder and Karkazis‘ argument is that it turns out that 
the word disorder in the name disorders of sex development is not the 
problem: the word sex is.  For, if the elements of the person‘s sex are actually 
just variation (and not disordered states) what unifies these disorders such that 
they make a coherent group?  In a different context, Karkazis (2008) herself 
writes, ―I ask, if one postulates bodies (including genitals, gonads, 
chromosomes, and hormones), what more does the word sex buy us?‖ (13).   
If acceptance of the multidimensional model would lead to rejection of the 
name ―disorder of sex development,‖ as I have just argued, how could or 
should one refer to such conditions?  To answer this question, I turn to a 
suggestion made by Sharon E. Preves (2003).  She writes, ―In order to 
improve the quality of life not just for those labeled intersexed, but for us all, 
we must remove or reduce the importance of gender categorization and the 




Preves suggests that instead of focusing on a biomedical condition as an 
intersex condition, the specific elements of that condition that affect the 
individual‘s health ought to be of concern to doctors (154).  Preves‘ 
suggestion is consistent with the multidimensional model.  If people were to 
reduce or eliminate sex categories (which would effectively be done in any 
case if the multidimensional model were adopted), intersex conditions would 
be identified by their health-related aspects:  the probability that the tissue will 
become cancerous, or physical difficulties related to urination or menstruation, 
or issues to do with fertility (if fertility were a concern for the individual).  
This is to say that intersex conditions would not be identified as conditions 
related to sex, and so there would be no motivation to speak of them as 
disorders of it.  Intersex conditions would become identified by their 
relationship to those processes that they disrupt (if they do indeed disrupt 
anything).  Such a radical change in medical focus would lead to changes in 
medical practice as well, as I discuss in the following two sections.    
 
7.2.1.2 Is informed consent possible? 
Right now, most parents who find out their new baby has an intersex condition 
will interpret the situation from the perspective of the folk understanding.  
They will have expected a child that is either male or female, and their minds 
will have difficulty understanding how the child can both combine elements of 
the incompatible categories, but be neither.  These parents can still surely love 
their child, but the child‘s sex will be, in many ways, a riddle.  Most of these 
parents (if not all) will turn to health care providers for help.  Many of these 
health care providers (if not all) will also be making sense of the child from 




Reflecting on this situation from the perspective of the multidimensional 
model reveals that aspects of this exchange are morally concerning even if 
they go unnoticed by those involved.  Specifically, the notion of informed 
consent becomes problematic with the acceptance of the multidimensional 
model.  In Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) 
identify disclosure as one element of informed consent (120 - 121).  
Beauchamp and Childress have the following to say about this feature:   
Professionals are generally obligated to disclose a core set 
of information, including (1) those facts or descriptions that 
patients or subjects usually consider material in deciding 
whether to refuse or consent to the proposed intervention or 
research, (2) information the professional believes to be 
material, (3) the professional‘s recommendation, (4) the 
purpose of seeking consent, and (5) the nature and limits of 
consent as an act or authorization. (121) 
There is disagreement about how elements (1) and (2) ought to be determined; 
Beauchamp and Childress explain that the doctor could use the ―Professional 
Practice Standard,‖ the ―Reasonable Person Standard,‖ or the ―Subjective 
Standard‖ (123 - 124).  Each of these standards suggests a different person that 
doctors ought to have in mind when they are determining how much 
information they ought to disclose (i.e., other doctors, rational people, and 
patients, respectively) (124).  
Acceptance of the multidimensional model reveals that the major obstacle 
created for informed consent in relation to intersex is that the dynamic at work 
between doctor and patient (or the person making decisions for the patient) 
does not fit the classic scenario assumed to exist in cases where informed 
consent is required.  In the classic scenario, doctors have expert knowledge 
and must decide which elements of that knowledge to share with the person 




patients could have a range of knowledge about their health and the procedure 
being considered, but since they are not medical experts like the doctors, their 
knowledge will always be incomplete.  Doctors are morally required to 
consider their expert knowledge against the patients‘ incomplete knowledge 
and determine (by one of the three standards Beauchamp and Childress 
describe) how much and what information they have the duty to disclose.  
Acceptance of the multidimensional model reveals that things are unlikely to 
occur this way in cases of intersexuality, for two important reasons:  (1) in all 
likelihood the doctor does not have all of the knowledge required to provide 
complete disclosure, and (2) in all likelihood the parents are unaware, and may 
never become aware, that there is any other relevant non-medical information 
to be had.  Put more succinctly, in almost all situations involving 
intersexuality neither the doctor nor the patient will be in an epistemic position 
where informed consent is even possible.  
The doctor‘s epistemic position related to intersexuality will be determined 
by medical training related to the topic.  While medical training might suffice 
to provide the epistemic position required for adequate disclosure related to 
things like kidneys or lungs or digestion, it is inadequate to provide the 
epistemic position necessary for morally complete disclosure about issues 
related to sex.  Biological sex is (as this dissertation demonstrates) a highly 
debated topic and medicine is but one discipline among many that purport to 
possess knowledge about it.   
An important difference between medicine and these other disciplines, of 
course, is that medicine has the power to work directly on the bodies its ideas 
are about.  Doctors and surgeons can change and rearrange tissues in addition 
to having theories about what those tissues and their arrangement mean.  
Disciplines such as sociology, history, philosophy, and women‘s studies do 




noted that the power to directly effect physical change is not an indication of 
the intellectual rigour of a particular position, nor of its wisdom.  It should also 
be noted that the opportunity for doctors and surgeons to act as experts about 
sex, and to be placed in a position of epistemic authority over patients and 
parents, might be a matter of happenstance.  It is true that most parents who 
have a baby that does not fit folk-categories turn to medicine, but it is also true 
that most patients and parents are already in that environment.  When almost 
all babies are born in hospitals, almost all babies with intersexual conditions 
are born into the hands of a doctor.  Things would likely be very different if 
these babies were born into the hands of philosophers, or sociologists.  But this 
would never happen, someone would likely object, because philosophers and 
sociologists do not have the knowledge required to deliver babies.  But why 
assume that doctors or other medical professionals have the knowledge 
required to understand and explain all the dimensions of intersexuality, some 
of which are sociological and some of which are philosophical?     
So, the concepts MALE and FEMALE are not under the sole intellectual 
jurisdiction of medicine, and it is unlikely that the doctor will be able to 
provide parents with the information they need to make a truly informed 
decision about their child.  What further confounds the situation is that the 
parents are also likely unaware that there exists any salient information 
beyond the medical information that the doctor provides to them.  Unless 
parents had time to research different conceptualizations of SEX, GENDER, and 
INTERSEXUALITY, they would likely be unaware that the doctor is unable to 
provide them with the information that they require to make an informed 
decision about whether or not to proceed with any medical intervention.   
Unless members of the medical community become aware that they are 
unable to provide the complete disclosure necessary to obtain informed 




interpretations of the medical situations involved and different answers to their 
questions, things will continue as they are and the ones to protest will be those 
on the outside of the exchange (such as the sociologists, historians, and 
philosophers).  But if one of these groups, or both, were to become aware that 
the situation could be improved, morally speaking, what sorts of changes 
would be suggested by the multidimensional understanding? 
Making consent related to intersex truly informed would have to involve at 
least two things.  First, the role of medicine would have to be reduced to 
dealing with the health aspects of the situation (which would not include 
establishing the sexual category the patient falls into).  Second, parents would 
have to be given the opportunity to discuss the issue and their questions with 
other non-medical experts.  Many hospitals now employ clinical ethicists, and 
parents might benefit from consultation with that person.  Whether or not the 
ethicist would be able to provide the information required for an informed 
decision would depend upon how much training that person has in the areas of 
sex and gender.  If the ethicist on staff has little to no training in this area, the 
hospital should have other people (perhaps respected scholars who work on 
these topics and have a good bedside manner) available to speak with the 
parents, if the parents so choose. 
Arranging for all of this communication would not be easy, and it would 
certainly take up time and resources, but if true informed consent is to be 
secured then it must be done.  Practically speaking, the hospital staff would 
also have to ensure that they are putting parents in contact with individuals 
who are able to appreciate the parents‘ situation, and respond to it with 
sensitivity and consideration.  Clinicians might want to shelter parents from 
the further stress and loss of privacy that involving others might cause, but this 
is not a morally defensible reason for denying them their right to complete 




being transparent about the fact that, if there is no medical concern related to 
the child‘s sexual presentation, then there is no need for the parents to involve 
the clinicians either.       
 
7.2.1.3 Should surgery be performed for intersex conditions? 
Even if concerns about informed consent were set aside, acceptance of the 
multidimensional model would still suggest other reasons to be concerned 
about the medical treatment of children with intersex conditions.  This section 
will discuss the ways in which acceptance of the multidimensional model 
would be likely to affect decisions made about surgical interventions on 
children with intersex conditions.  
It must first be recognized that most parents of children with intersex 
conditions will understand biological sex from the perspective of the folk 
understanding;  because of this, most parents who are faced with decisions 
about their child‘s condition will be trying to make sense of both the condition 
and the treatment from within the folk understanding.  As mentioned 
previously, making sense of intersex from within the folk understanding is an 
impossible challenge simply because of the logic of the folk understanding.  
The ways that MALE and FEMALE are conceptualized within that understanding 
do not allow for any comingling of the two;  in fact, from the perspective of 
the folk understanding, an intersex state is as illogical as any other state that 
violates the law of non-contradiction.  Commenting on this sort of shock, 
Zeiler and Wickstrom (2009) state that when a child with an intersex condition 
is born ―[p]arents suddenly realize that not all children are born as either a girl 
or a boy.  What they previously took for granted, the division of humans into 




perceived when the birth of a child with an intersexual condition causes this 
sort of conceptual crisis and disruption?    
Zeiler and Wickstrom explain that for many parents of children with 
intersex conditions ―[n]ot letting one‘s child undergo surgery becomes 
conceptualized as a way to make the child stand out and not be in line‖ (369).  
Understanding a parent‘s choice in this way implies that surgery is perceived 
as offering a benefit to the child (i.e., the chance to ―be in line‖ with others 
whose bodies uphold the beliefs of the folk understanding). Surgery might also 
offer a benefit for the parents; as Dreger (2006) explains, ―medical and 
surgical intervention is the primary means of demonstrating caring for many 
clinicians, patients, and family members‖ (78).  If consenting to surgery is 
thought to offer these children a chance to have their differences erased or 
minimized and become like their soon-to-be peers, and if it also provides 
parents with an opportunity to express their affection for their beleaguered 
child, then it seems clear that, at least with respect to these two motivations, 
the folk understanding can see such surgery as morally justified. 
What I wish to point out here is that acceptance of the multidimensional 
model would not lead to acceptance of these motivations.  Dreger (2006) 
states ―[w]hat you think intersex is determines how you think you‘re supposed 
to treat it, and what you think the ethical issues are‖ (81).  If Dreger is right, 
then acceptance of the multidimensional model would alter the conceptual 
background against which parents encounter and understand their newborn 
child, and thereby alter the range of morally acceptable medical treatments for 
that child.  Surgery would be among those medical treatments that would be 
reconsidered.  How would acceptance of the multidimensional model alter 
one‘s perception of the moral acceptability of surgery for intersex conditions?  
I would argue that parents who accept the multidimensional model of sex, 




likely to provide consent for non-medically necessary surgery on their children 
for reasons related to intersexuality.   
One reason I think that parents would be less likely to consent to surgical 
treatment is because acceptance of the multidimensional model would do 
away with the dramatic conceptual disruption that can accompany the child‘s 
birth, as mentioned earlier.  The child would still have a body unlike most 
other people‘s, but that body would no longer be an exception to the folk rules 
of sexual categorization, simply because the old rules would no longer be in 
effect.      
In addition to this benefit, the multidimensional model would offer families 
the opportunity to see the complexity of different abnormalities, and the ways 
in which their child‘s body can simultaneously exhibit both normality and 
abnormality with regards to sex (which, under the multidimensional 
understanding would be understood as prototypicality and non-prototypicality, 
respectively).  Rather than the blunt treatment provided by the folk 
understanding, according to which one is either male, female, or simply 
unexplainable, the multidimensional model can help to provide a thorough 
explanation of the ways in which the child‘s body is like other people‘s bodies 
and how it is simultaneously unlike other people‘s bodies  This capacity of the 
multidimensional model, I believe, would help to relieve some of the initial 
shock and despair that parents are likely to experience once their child‘s non-
prototypical sex is known.   
If the birth of a child with an intersexual condition did not cause conceptual 
disruption and was not accompanied by intense shock and despair over the 
child‘s abnormality, would non-medically necessary surgery be justified for 
some other reason?  On the face of it I cannot see how someone who accepts 




also remaining committed to the basic features of the understanding.  All  
major justification for non-medically necessary surgery seem to be reliant on 
the folk understanding itself, and specifically its commitments to logical 
opposition and atomistic structure.  But if these beliefs are no longer held, and 
instead one sees male and female as ways to describe individual parts, and sex 
itself as composed of a number of features, it is difficult to see what non-
medical reason one could have to consent to have their child‘s sex surgically 
altered. 
 
7.2.2     Breast cancer 
Breast cancer occurs most frequently in people who have exclusively female 
reproductive parts.  It also currently occurs in a society dominated by the folk 
understanding, which identifies female reproductive parts with femaleness, 
and femaleness with femininity.  It is not surprising then that breast cancer has 
become a feminized disease, meaning that its representations in society tie it 
up with gender stereotypes.  The quintessential feminine colour, pink, has 
come to represent the disease and research campaigns associated with it.  The 
Breast Cancer Society of Canada (whose website is overwhelmingly pink) has 
co-ordinated with a retailer of women‘s clothes for an annual fundraising 
activity: a walk through a mall scheduled close to, or on, Mother‘s Day 
(Breast Cancer Society of Canada 2011; Mother's Day Walk 2011).   
These feminized representations of the disease are misleading, partly 
because more than just folk-females can and do develop breast cancer.  The 
fact is that anyone with a breast (or two) can develop the disease.  Some 
groups have tried to correct the misleading femininization of the disease, but 
they have done so from within the folk understanding as well.  For example, 




adding a gradient change to blue (John W. Nick Foundation Inc. 2011), and 
another by laying a blue ribbon over top of the pink ribbon (Male Breast 
Cancer Awareness 2011).  Blue is, of course, the quintessential masculine 
colour, and the message is that both men and women can develop the disease. 
The multidimensional model takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to apply 
at the level of parts, not people.  Breast cancer is therefore not ―a female 
disease‖ nor is it ―a woman‘s disease,‖ but not because it is also ―a male 
disease‖ or ―a man‘s disease.‖  There are no sexes to own the disease in this 
way; there are simply people with breasts, and some of these people will be 
more likely to develop the disease than others.  This is not just a conceptual 
point, because the way a disease is represented to the public can have moral 
implications, especially in a society that sanctions deviance from gender 
stereotypes and takes ―males‖ and ―females‖ to be opposite.  Men in our 
society are strongly encouraged to avoid the colour pink; they are also led to 
believe that in being men they are the opposites of women (speaking generally 
again).  The feminization of breast cancer, then, creates an image of the 
disease as if it is something that is not to do with them, despite the fact that 
breast cancer can occur in anyone with breast tissue.  The feminization of 
breast cancer that occurs in connection with the folk understanding not only 
affects the messages that folk-males receive, but it can also affect the care they 
receive.  In April 2010, it was reported that an American man who suspected 
that he had developed breast cancer (as his father had) was denied services at a 
breast cancer facility in the state of North Carolina because it ―only serves 
women, aged 40 to 60‖ (James 2010). 
Accepting the multidimensional model would lead to rejecting both the idea 
that breast cancer is a woman‘s disease, and the secondary idea that it is more 
accurate to claim it is also a man‘s disease.  Because ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ are 




multidimensional understanding, it provides no reason to speak of a disease 
(or anything else) as if it were exclusive to, or more likely to develop in, 
people of one type or the other.  From the perspective of the multidimensional 
understanding, breast cancer would be represented and conceptualized as a 
disease that develops in breast tissue, and those individuals with more female 
sexual parts (in both quantity and degree) are more likely to develop it.     
 
7.2.3   Preconception sex selection 
If the multidimensional model of sex were accepted the medical procedure 
called ―preconception sex selection‖ would also be considered morally 
problematic. What follows is part of the Genetics & IVF Institute‘s description 
of the ―Scientific Basis‖ of sex selection by sperm sorting: 
The MicroSort Technology is based on the fact that the X 
chromosome is substantially larger than the Y 
chromosome... Since chromosomes are made of DNA, 
human sperm cells having an X chromosome will contain 
approximately 2.8% more total DNA than sperm cells 
having a Y chromosome.  This DNA difference can be 
measured and the X- and Y-bearing sperm cells individually 
separated using a modified flow cytometer instrument. 
(Genetics and IVF Institute, 2011) 
But since this technology has been created with the folk understanding of sex 
in mind, obtaining a sperm with (just) an X chromosome or a Y chromosome 
is to secure more than a haploid cell with a certain feature.  From the 
perspective of the folk understanding, obtaining a sperm with a Y 
chromosome is to secure a sperm that will produce a male baby who will 
become a boy who will become a man.  Obtaining a sperm with (just) an X 
chromosome is to secure a sperm that will produce a female baby who will 




understanding, are just indicators of the total package to come.  Their 
predictive value arises from the atomistic nature and the epistemic import that 
the folk understanding takes biological sex to have.  If one knows the sex 
chromosomes one knows the whole sex, and if one knows the sex one also 
knows what type of person that person will be. 
The multidimensional understanding, of course, has a different 
interpretation of what this technology is actually capable of doing.  The 
multidimensional understanding takes sexual parts to be interrelated in the 
sense that they affect each other in important ways, but it also takes them to be 
independently variable.  A person might have all female parts, but some might 
be more prototypical than others; alternatively, a person might have some 
combination of male and female parts. From the perspective of the 
multidimensional understanding, this technology helps to distinguish X 
chromosome bearing sperm from Y chromosome bearing sperm, but nothing 
else can be claimed of it with certainty.  
It is worth mentioning again that the multidimensional model would not 
deny common sense.  Choosing a sperm with an X chromosome is more likely 
to result in a child with more female reproductive elements, and choosing a 
sperm with a Y chromosome is more likely to result in a child with more male 
reproductive elements.  Nevertheless, the multidimensional model highlights 
that choosing a particular sperm does not guarantee anything about the sex of 
the person it might produce.   
The important moral question, then, is how does the failure to realize that 
sperm sorting offers no guarantees to do with sex (for reasons beyond the use 
of a ―wrong‖ sperm), affect the people who use this technology and the babies 
produced by it?  Parents who wish to conceive a child using sperm sorting 




strong motivating reasons.  If parents who use the technology do have such 
strong motivations, then at least some of them are also likely to have 
expectations of that child that go beyond sexual features themselves. Is it 
morally desirable to conceive a child with sex-based expectations in mind?  
(The parents might not realize that they do have such expectations: what the 
multidimensional model interprets as expectations, the folk understanding 
interprets as certainty.)  What is most important, morally speaking, is what 
happens if the child does not meet the parent‘s sex-based expectations.  What 
reactions might parents have if the child conceived from a Y bearing sperm is 
not so prototypically male (as could happen, for example, if the individual 
conceived has some degree of Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome)?  What 
reactions might they have if the child conceived by the Y bearing sperm tends 
to favour more stereotypically feminine toys and clothes?  Because these 
parents are likely to have strong motivations to use sperm sorting technology, 
they are also likely to have strong reactions if it fails to produce the type of 
child they thought they chose.  
Someone could argue that most parents have the same reactions and 
expectations of their children, though they are based upon the child‘s external 
genitalia rather than chromosomes.  I think that such an observation is correct.  
The belief that sex has epistemic import – that if one knows another‘s sex, one 
knows more than just that other‘s sex – is always morally problematic.  I think 
that, at least on a prima facie basis, we ought to resist any simplification of the 
individual to flawed folk-categories that are wrapped up with gender 
stereotypes.  And so I do not think that the general existence of parental 
expectations related to sex mitigate the moral concerns raised by conceptual 
shifts about sex and sperm sorting technology;  they just reveal that sperm 
sorting provides a unique occasion for them to be implemented.  However, I 




actively selected from the others because the parents believe it will produce ―a 
boy‖ or ―a girl.‖   
My highlighting of these concerns should not be taken to suggest that I think 
that sperm sorting is not morally permissible, or that it ought not ever be used.  
The moral problems I have mentioned have to do with expectations placed on 
the child conceived by the selected sperm.  If the expectations were altered to 
reflect the fact that the sperm having an X or a Y chromosome guarantees 
nothing more than that the child will have an X or a Y sex chromosome, then 
the hesitancy I have expressed would be addressed.   
 
 
7.3  Non-medical moral issues 
7.3.1   Sex segregated social spaces 
Outside of the area of medicine, the folk understanding also motivates the 
creation and maintenance of sex-specific spaces in society.  In many cultures 
throughout the world one can find sex-specific washrooms, change rooms, 
schools and classrooms, as well as certain living areas such as shelters, camps, 
prisons, and college and university housing.  Since these spaces are created 
with the folk understanding in mind, they are designated as ‗male‘ or ‗female‘ 
spaces.   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, acceptance of the multidimensional 
model brings with it rejection of the idea that all human beings can be divided 
into just two sexual types.  This rejection does not necessarily mean that 
someone who holds the multidimensional view will be opposed to sex-
segregated spaces, even if that segregation is based on folk categories.  All 




promote it over the folk understanding.  But all things might not be equal:  
there could be good reasons, morally speaking, to continue to segregate spaces 
using folk-categories if using those categories somehow secures certain moral 
goods for society.  Even though the multidimensional and folk understandings 
of sex are at odds with one another about most things, they could still agree 
that the practical effects of one are better, morally speaking, than the other‘s.  
To see if dividing spaces by folk-sex categories is something society ought to 
continue to do even after the multidimensional model is accepted, we first 
need an understanding of the moral goods it is claimed to promote.   
To narrow the scope of this discussion, I will focus here on just one example 
of sex-segregated space:  shared washrooms.  With the words shared 
washrooms I simply mean those facilities that are designed to be used by more 
than one person at a time.   
What are the moral justifications?  It is difficult to find a well-reasoned 
argument, or any argument at all, that clarifies the moral justification behind 
sex-segregated washrooms.  But the justification should not be taken for 
granted, especially once the underlying categories upon which the segregation 
is based have been reconceptualized.  To gain an idea of what the apparently 
self-evident moral justification is, I looked for Canadian legal cases that 
involved access to sex-segregated washrooms.  The most informative one that 
I found was the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal case Seguin vs. Great Blue 
Heron Charity Casino (2007) that specifically identifies three moral values 
related to sex segregated washrooms:  privacy, safety, and public decency.  In 
the discussion that follows, I have chosen not to evaluate the claim that sex-
segregated washrooms ensure public decency.  The notion of ―public decency‖ 
is itself highly contentious, and I do not wish to enter that debate here.  In 
addition to this, a moral justification is simply inconsistent if it appeals to both 




be some reasoning that engages the idea that the similarity of external and 
internal genitalia affect a situation‘s relative private or public nature.  Since 
most people, I would guess, would favour sex-segregated bathrooms for 
reasons of privacy rather than for reasons of public decency, I have chosen to 
address the former.  
 To evaluate the effect of the multidimensional model on the moral 
justification of sex-segregated washrooms, the question then becomes whether 
or not privacy and safety are actually promoted by sex-segregated washrooms 
given that the folk categorization is flawed.  To answer this question, the first 
point to note is that many people do fit nicely into the folk categories, and 
most people fit well enough to have their differences unacknowledged or 
unnoticed by others.  I will assume for the present that sex segregated 
washrooms do promote safety and privacy for those people who embody or 
approximate the prototypical male or female forms.  Does it do the same for 
those whose sex is less prototypical?  There are individuals whose variation 
does not go unnoticed or unacknowledged, even if they consider themselves 
unambiguous.  There are also individuals who have modified sexual features 
(either voluntarily or not), and these modifications might take them out of 
these prototypical categories.  There are also those who are born with a sex 
that combines male and female features.  There is good reason to think that for 
all of these people, sex-segregated shared washrooms are actually likely to 
violate both privacy and safety. 
First, the people whose bodies emphasize the complex and multidimensional 
nature of sex are overlooked by the simple division between ―males‖ and 
―females‖:  when they enter a space designated as ―male-only‖ or ―female-
only,‖ they are entering a space that quite literally was designed without them 
in mind.  Segregated washrooms reify the folk understanding; from the belief 




not match up with the flesh and blood reality.  If they wish to, or must use the 
sex-specific space, at least two things must take place.  They must first make 
themselves fit the folk categories, meaning that they must identify as one or 
the other.  Following this, the other people already using the washroom must 
accept them by providing tacit approval.  This approval can be given either by 
not noticing anything at all or by choosing to look the other way (perhaps 
literally).  Failure to receive this acceptance is likely to cause psychological 
harm, and perhaps physical harm as well, as will be discussed shortly.  
So, people who exhibit difference are forced to use spaces that do not 
acknowledge difference. Is this morally wrong in and of itself?  Not 
necessarily.  The practice could still have good effects for the majority of 
people, and come at little to no cost to the minority.  The fact is, though, that 
there is a cost to those who do not easily fit the folk categories.  I would argue 
that for anyone who has a less than typical appearance with respect to gender, 
using a sex segregated shared washroom actually poses risks to both safety 
and privacy.  They pose this risk because shared washrooms, despite all the 
discussion about privacy, are not usually very private; they can only ever be as 
private as a shared space can be (which, obviously, is not likely to be very 
private at all). Whenever people share a space they gather information about 
others and make conclusions about them, even without trying.  Everyone has 
experienced this.  One needs only to think back to the last time other people 
were observed, maybe at the doctor‘s office or a bus stop.  Human beings are 
notorious for drawing conclusions about others from various information, such 
as the other people‘s clothes, the subject of their conversations, what they are 
reading or otherwise doing to pass the time, and who they are with.  The same 
process of information gathering and conclusion-making happens in 
washrooms.  People see each other on the way in, on the way out, and while 




person just from being in the adjacent stall (especially if that other person is 
accompanied by a child who is inquisitive, or talkative, or likes to open the 
door, or likes to see who is on the other side of the partial wall).  Shared 
washrooms are shared spaces and being in shared spaces always involves a 
loss of privacy.   
For the person whose sexual parts are not prototypically male or 
prototypically female, this loss of privacy has the potential to be greater than 
for those who have a prototypical sex, or pass as having it.  More of their 
privacy is at risk because the standards for maleness and femaleness increase 
in any sex-segregated space. Ambiguity that might be unnoticed, overlooked, 
or unquestioned in non-segregated spaces will face greater criticism and 
scrutiny in a sex-segregated space.  By the social rules based on the folk 
understanding, when people enter a sex-segregated shared washroom they are 
sending the message that they are 1) of one sex and not the other, and are 2) 
identical to anyone already in the washroom (assuming they have all followed 
the social rules as well).  In addition to being forced to make a self-declaration 
which then must be validated by others already in the washroom, the 
individual‘s privacy could be further compromised by others observing a 
―mismatch‖ between what that person does in the washroom and what 
behaviour  is expected of someone of that sex.  For example, a person may 
observe someone enter the women‘s washroom and thereby identify as a 
female, and then enter a stall and urinate with feet facing toward the toilet.  Or, 
a person may observe someone enter the men‘s washroom, and thereby 
identify as a male, and then enter a stall (perhaps bypassing the available 
urinals) and urinate with feet facing away from the toilet.  In both of these 
cases, the ―passive‖ observer will learn a lot more about that individual than 
what could reasonably be expected to be learned from people with more 




Therefore, sex segregated shared washrooms will always pose a greater loss 
of privacy for those whose sex is non-prototypical, because the segregation is 
itself based on the assumption of prototypicality.  Because of this greater loss 
of privacy, and because of the public‘s general tendency to react negatively to 
ambiguity about sex, sex-segregated shared washrooms have the great 
potential to become unsafe places for individuals whose sex is not prototypical 
(or even if their appearance suggests this).  To use these spaces, the individual 
could be subjected to such things as curious looks, insensitive questions, 
disdainful comments, physical harm, and maybe worse.  Valerie Bustros was 
attacked for using the women‘s washroom at a club on the York University 
campus in Toronto; those who attacked her thought ―she was using the wrong 
washroom‖ (CBC News 2011).  Chrissy Lee Polis, a transgender teenager 
from Maryland, was beaten to the point of seizure for using the women‘s 
washroom at a McDonald‘s restaurant (McCabe 2011).  The moral values of 
privacy and safety, therefore, do not seem secured for all by the practice of 
sex-segregating washrooms. 
I can anticipate a possible objection.  Someone might say that individuals 
whose bodies are exceptions to the folk understanding could minimize the risk 
to their privacy and safety by choosing to use a non-shared, sex-neutral 
washroom, or by choosing only to use the washrooms in their homes or other 
places they assume to be safe.  As well as being impractical, these suggestions 
help to illustrate how sex-segregation based on the folk understanding is 
oppressive for those who fall outside of the categories.  Marilyn Frye (1983a) 
used the concept of the ―double-bind‖ to help explain how oppression 
functions: 
One of the most characteristic and ubiquitous features of the 
world as experienced by oppressed people is the double 




and all of them expose one to penalty, censure or 
deprivation.  (2) 
Frye discusses examples of this phenomenon as women encounter them: 
If one dresses one way, one is subject to the assumption that 
one is advertising one‘s sexual availability; if one dresses 
another way, one appears to ―not care about oneself‖ or to 
be ―unfeminine.‖  If one uses ―strong language,‖ one invites 
categorization as a whore or a slut; if one does not, one 
invites categorization as a ―lady‖ – one too delicately 
constituted to cope with robust speech or the realities to 
which it presumably refers. (4) 
The suggestion that non-prototypical people can simply choose not to use 
sex-segregated shared washrooms fits the pattern of the double bind.  People 
can either use the sex-segregated shared washroom and risk safety and 
privacy, or can deprive themselves the use of such washrooms altogether and 
accept the presence of a barrier in their public lives that nobody else in society 
has to experience.  The suggestion that certain individuals can choose to avoid 
certain potentially harmful situations by instead choosing to do something that 
brings with it is own type of harm does not go a long way in addressing the 
underlying problems with sex-segregated, shared washrooms.   
The previous discussion has argued that sex-segregated shared washrooms 
pose risks to both privacy and safety for individuals whose sexual parts are not 
prototypical, and has concluded that the practice is potentially harmful for 
them.  If one is concerned with equality and justice, then these realizations 
will be enough to show that sex-segregated shared washrooms are morally 
problematic.  But people who are most concerned with other moral values 
might remain unconvinced; these people might maintain that some degree of 
harm is acceptable if the practice secures some moral benefit for the majority.  
So, do sex segregated washrooms really promote and ensure safety and 




Christine Overall (2007) addresses many arguments in favour of sex-
segregated washrooms, including the appeal to safety and the appeal to 
privacy.  Concerning the former, Overall states, ―the concern for safety should 
be an argument against segregation‖ (82, emphasis in original).  Her reasoning 
is that sex segregated washrooms actually create settings for violence by 
increasing isolation (82).  ―Assailants are less likely to act‖ she says, ―in an 
environment where they can easily be seen and heard‖ (82).   
Overall also rejects concern for privacy as a moral justification for sex 
segregated washrooms: 
It is not clear that there is anything inevitable or necessary 
about defining personal privacy by reference to one‘s 
genitalia.  Nor is there anything inevitable or necessary 
about the practice of preserving privacy by grouping people 
on the basis of their putative sameness of genitalia.  (80) 
I agree with Overall on both of these points, and I think that the 
multidimensional model can help strengthen them by revealing the illusion 
that is at work in this sort of reasoning.  Treating sexual variation as if it were 
dichotomous gives the impression that everyone using a certain washroom 
(assuming no one has broken social rules about using the ―wrong‖ washroom) 
is identical with respect to sex.  This impression, however, is false.  Even if 
nobody ever entered the washroom of the ―opposite sex,‖ using the washroom 
of ―your own sex‖ does not guarantee that everyone else in that washroom will 
be identical with respect to sex.  The complexity of sex in combination with 
the folk understanding‘s requirement that everyone identify as one sex or the 
other means that people who call themselves female will do so for different 
reasons, as will people who call themselves males.  The social rules regarding 
sex-segregated washrooms require individuals to identify as one sex or the 
other, and enter the washroom of the sex with which they identify.  (Usually 




coercion – is itself not even recognized.) The multidimensional model reveals 
that everyone‘s adherence to the social rules will ensure nothing more than 
that all people in a space identify as the same sex: adherence to the social rules 
does not ensure that everyone has identified themselves that way for the same 
reason.    
Therefore, if sex-segregation is not accomplishing those things it was 
thought to, then the suffering and hardship of a minority (those who are 
category outliers under the folk understanding) cannot be overshadowed by 
the privacy and safety that others are said  to appreciate through the practice.  
To my mind, this means that sex segregated washrooms are morally 
questionable based on concerns about equality and justice for a minority of 
people, as well as by concerns about the truth of the moral goods claimed for 
the majority.  But what would be an alternative?   
When it comes to sex-segregated washrooms, society apparently has two 
options:  have them, or don‘t.  It seems that society ought to consider the 
possibility of non-segregated, shared washrooms.  As was pointed out earlier, 
acceptance of the multidimensional model reveals that the creation of two 
separate spaces does not reflect the biological reality of sex; because of this, 
what we experience now is already not what most people tend to think it is.  
Additionally, Overall argued that non-segregated washrooms might actually 
help to increase safety (82); I think they might also help to increase privacy as 
well.  A non-segregated washroom will tend to be busier than a sex-segregated 






7.3.2   Sex segregated sports competitions 
Sexually segregated sports competitions are probably the best known and the 
least criticized example of sexual segregation in our society.  Most people, I 
would think, do not think twice about the moral justification of creating two 
pools of competitors based on sex.  But what does justify this?  Why is sex-
specific competition a morally good thing?   
From the perspective of the folk understanding, males as a type of human 
being generally have greater strength and athletic skill than females, a 
distinctly different type of human being.  For many people who endorse the 
folk understanding,  I think, limiting competition to individuals of the same 
sex is thought to help promote fairness: every individual has a fair shot at 
doing well as each is competing against only those human beings of the same 
sexual type, and thereby, the same athletic skill level as well.  This reasoning 
of course implies that mixed-sex competitions would be inherently unfair 
because of the natural tendency for one type to excel over the other in matters 
related to athletics.   
In sports competitions, then, people are divided into two sex-based groups 
that are thought to encompass all human beings, and this division is done in 
the interest of ensuring fair competition.  The multidimensional model 
highlights that this division is based on but two possibilities.  Acceptance of 
the multidimensional model would require reconsideration of this reasoning.  
If human beings are not either male or female (because these describe parts, 
not people), then what is actually happening when human beings are divided 
into these two ill-conceived, sex-based groups?  The answer to this question 
will determine whether an appeal to fairness can justify continuing to behave 
as if the segregation of athletes on this basis could be done.   
When people use the folk understanding to divide the whole human 




choosing to include those individuals whose sexual features all appear at the 
far ends of the male and female quadrants of the multidimensional model, and 
(2) overlooking variation by fitting classificatory outliers into one of these two 
groups.  (This particular point will be returned to in discussion of other 
practices as well.) 
Keeping these in mind, the question to be addressed is,  does dividing 
athletes as if there were only two sexual types help to promote fair 
competition?  It appears not to, as this division creates a situation in which 
people are judged by their sex first (understood as male or female) and their 
athletic ability second.  In similar but separate cases, South African runner 
Caster Semenya and Indian runner Santhi Soundarajan had to have their sex 
―verified‖ to ensure that they really should have been competing with females, 
as they had, and not males (The New York Times 2009; AFP 2007).  Canadian 
cyclist Michelle Dumaresq, a male-to-female transsexual person, had the 
authenticity of both her sex and her first-place victory questioned by some of 
her fellow competitors, most notably Danika Schroeter who wore a shirt with 
the message ―100% woman‖ to accept her second-place award (The 
Vancouver Sun 2006).  At the 2010 Olympic winter games ski jumpers 
identified as female were not allowed to compete, but ski jumpers identified as 
male were (The Canadian Press 2009).  These athletes‘ ability to compete, and 
in some cases their results, were scrutinized on the basis of their sex:  a feature 
that is related to atheltic ability, but irrelevant to the purpose of competition 
which is to determine who from a pool of competitors has the greatest athletic 
ability in a particular sport. The maleness and femaleness of a person‘s sexual 
features are related to athletic ability, but so are other features such as height 
and weight.  Given the purpose of athletic competition, it seems unfair to 
preemptively create separate pools of competitors, and perhaps altogether 




than what the competition is actually interested in measuring and comparing. 
And from the perspective of the multidimensional understanding, it is even 
more questionable when this division is based on faulty conceptualizations. 
So what would the multidimensional model suggest in relation to 
competitive sports?  The first thing is that whether one‘s sexual parts can be 
described as male, female, or both, seems unimportant in the attempt to 
determine how one‘s athletic ability measures up against someone else‘s.  The 
existence of different athletic abilities is what motivates competition.  The fact 
that maleness and femaleness of sexual parts tends to produce differences in 
athletic ability needs to carry with it no more meaning than the fact that having 
large lungs and long legs do as well.  Certain facts about one‘s body will affect 
one‘s athletic ability; one‘s sex (i.e., the maleness and femaleness of one‘s 
sexual parts) is just one of these.   
In competitive sports there can be unfair advantages and there can be unfair 
disadvantages; the natural state of one‘s body, which includes the maleness 
and femaleness of one‘s sexual parts, cannot cause either of these.  So dividing 
by sex artificially divides people prior to comparing athletic ability; once one 
lets go of the idea that there are just two sexual categories, the rationale behind 
sex segregation in sports seems to undermine the main purpose of competitive 
sports (which, of course, is competition).   
These conclusions, I admit, are uncomfortable.  The automatic response 
would probably be something like ―But without sex segregation females 
would never get to compete in higher level competitions, and surely that‘s 
unfair.‖  Assuredly, it does seem unfair, and perhaps unwise, to stop a practice 
that allows more people to compete.   I think this automatic response, 




Someone with the multidimensional understanding in mind would first ask 
what is meant by the word female in the statement of the criticism.  If one is 
thinking from the multidimensional understanding, then the existence of an 
identifiable, homogeneous group referred to by the word female is itself 
problematic. From the perspective of the multidimensional model, the 
criticism refers to a non-existent group.   
But perhaps this response is semantic fussiness.  Using the multidimensional 
conceptualization, the criticism highlights the fact that, without continued 
attempts at sex-segregation, those individuals with parts that are more female 
than male will be less likely to be successful in higher-level athletic 
competitions with other human beings.  It is crucial to notice, however, that 
this is true of anyone with less athletic ability, no matter the cause of it.  The 
multidimensional model takes maleness and femaleness to apply at the level of 
parts, and so competition is simply between people; some of these people have 
parts that are more male, others have parts that are less male, some have parts 
that are more female, others have parts that are less female, and some might 
have both.  Unless it is assumed that there is some sort of inherent moral 
equality between male and female parts, the sexual type of parts that an athlete 
has is irrelevant to athletic competition.     
The deep fear behind this criticism, I think, is that if sports were not sex-
segregated males would always be the winners (and females would always be 
the losers), which seems distinctly unfair.  But again, who does one have in 
mind here?  Someone who approaches the issue with the multidimensional 
understanding in mind would not see things this way.  This person would not 
recognize ―males‖ and ―females‖ as stable, identifiable groups of people in the 
first place. Someone who holds the multidimensional understanding would 




In conclusion it must be noted that doing away with attempted sex 
segregation in sports does not necessarily mean that anyone with less athletic 
ability (the majority of whom, I agree, may have more female than male 
sexual components) will not be able to play sports.  People can engage in 
sports for reasons other than competition, including such things as team 
building, community involvement, recreation, and physical exercise.  All of 
these, like competition, would remain equally open to everyone even if the 
activities were no longer segregated on the basis of sex. 
 
 
7.4   Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show that this conceptual shift can make 
important differences in the lives of many people, and not just those whose sex 
is something other than the standard folk-female or folk-male types; the 
chapter has also attempted to show that these important differences would 
occur both within and outside of the medical realm.   
The second chapter stated that even if concepts are never thought to be more 
or less accurate than those that come before them, there can still be good 
reason (i.e., the improvement of human life) to participate in the activity of 
reconceptualization, and to adopt a reconceptualization that is offered.  One 
could be interested in conceptual efficacy along with (or for some, instead of) 
conceptual accuracy.  This chapter, I hope, has provided strong reasons to 
think that whether or not the multidimensional model is a more biologically 
accurate conceptualization of sex, its promotion and adoption would offer 
significant improvements to the quality of human life. 
To be clear, I do think that the multidimensional model of sex is more 




the multiple continua model, and even the hybrid model, for all of the reasons 
already discussed.  The multidimensional model can represent the complexity 
of sex (as the hybrid and multiple continua models do), it can represent the 
gradation that can exist between male and female forms of sexual features (as 
all of the continua models do), and it can represent the fact that certain 
features of sex can be both highly male and highly female (which none of the 
other models can do).  The multidimensional model, in its very structure, 
recognizes that to represent all of these things the concepts MALE and FEMALE 
must also be reconceptualized, and the relationship between them must be 
reassessed.  The multidimensional model, in doing all of these things, also 
offers great improvements over the folk understanding of sex which, from the 
perspective of the multidimensional understanding, is mistaken about sex in 
almost all respects. 
There are, of course, questions that remain to be answered about the 
multidimensional model, its implementation, and the practical effects it might 
have on day-to-day life.  The authenticity of maleness and femaleness of 
sexual features is one topic that remains to be examined.  It is quite possible 
that exploring the topic of authenticity might suggest further refinement of the 
model, and enrich it thereby.  Another remaining question focuses upon the 
calibration of the dimensions of the model.  Would the increments on the 
continua be small and precise, or larger and more general?  To venture a 
response to this particular question I would suggest that the degree of 
precision ought to be determined by the intended use of the model.  Some 
clinical uses might require greater precision (for example, if the model is 
being used to track the effect of hormone therapy on an individual), but for 
other uses such precision might not be necessary at all (for example, providing 
a rough location of features would do just fine for people using the model just 




I would like to end this dissertation with statements about what can be 
concluded, rather than statements about what can be further investigated.   
And I do think that, at this point, a number of conclusions can be made.  A 
person‘s sex is not a simple thing: it is made up of individual components that 
must be given individual attention for the person‘s sex to be understood 
completely and accurately.  The words male and female do not identify whole 
people: they describe individual parts of people‘s bodies.  The concepts MALE 
and FEMALE are importantly related, but are not logically opposed.  And, as I 
hope this final chapter has shown, reaching these conclusions and allowing 
them to become active in our day-to-day lives can have great benefits for 
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